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ABSTRACT
At its original inception in 1960, the Real Estate
Investment Trust (REIT) was created as a vehicle for
passively holding and overseeing properties for the benefit
of its shareholders. In that context, real estate
development seems like an unlikely pursuit for a REIT.
Nevertheless, a small number of REITs have adopted
value-creation strategies to build their portfolios, either
through development or substantial renovation of existing
properties. Out of 117 tax-qualified REITs listed on the
major stock exchanges, at least 13 were identified as
following some type of value-creation strategy. Some havebeen remarkably successful, while others face losses that
threaten continued operation. REITs, as investment
vehicles, are generally not well understood. Little, if
any, research on value-creation REITs, as a category, has
been published. REITs also represent an alternative source
of capital for development, an important concern in current
U.S. markets where many traditional sources of both debt and
equity have retreated from real estate investment.
One of two basic value-creation strategies is typically
followed. First, some REITs acquire existing properties,
then initiate renovation, redevelopment, expansion of
existing structures and, in some cases, development of new
buildings on vacant land. Second, other REITs have engaged
in development s through the use of joint venture
partnerships with developers. Chapter One profiles the
legislative changes that have enabled REITs to pursue these
more flexible investment strategies. Chapter Two presents
the advantages and disadvantages of the REIT format for
development and discuses the two basic approaches. Tracking
the performance of six case-study REITs in Chapter Three
indicates that the Acquisition & Redevelopment REITs have
outperformed the younger Joint Venture group. It explores
differences in the two approaches and other factors that
lead to the variance in performance, both as developers and
as market securities. The Conclusions section summarizes
the findings and presents new alternative uses of the REIT
in the development process.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Associate Professor of Planning and
Real Estate Development
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CHAPTER ONE:
VALUE CREATION AND THE REIT-- A RECENT UNION
At its original inception in 1960, the Real Estate
Investment Trust (REIT) was created as a vehicle for
passively holding and overseeing properties for the benefit
of its shareholders. Enabling legislation was designed to
restrict REITs to that limited agenda. In that context,
real estate development seems like an unlikely pursuit for a
REIT. Nevertheless, a small number of REITs have adopted
value-creation strategies to build their portfolios, either
through development or substantial renovation of existing
properties. Out of 117 tax-qualified REITs listed on the
major stock exchanges, at least 13 were identified as
following some type of value-creation strategy. Some have
been remarkably successful, while others face losses that
threaten continued operation. REITs today are being used to
deploy an increasingly diverse range of investment
strategies; yet as investment vehicles, they are generally
not well understood. They attract a much smaller following
in the investment community than other securities. Little,
if any, research on value-creation REITs, as a category, has
been published.
With broader usage and more specialization, the REIT
has proven to be a flexible vehicle which has outgrown the
three simple categories widely recognized in the industry.
Based on the type of real estate assets, the National
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT)
categorizes its member REITs into three groups: Equity
REITs, which invest primarily in real properties; Mortgage
REITs, which invest primarily in mortgage notes secured by
real estate; and Hybrid REITs, which hold some combination
of debt and equity investments. Some have suggested these
three simple categories are no longer adequate to describe
the broad diversity of investment strategies employed among
REITs.1 More and more REITs are adopting highly specialized
investment strategies rather than diversified holdings.
Specialization can be by property type, geographic region,
or investment activity. A small, but notable area of
specialization is through value creation-- REITs that add
value to their portfolios by participating in the
development or renovation of property.
Each value-creation REIT is unique, but one of two basic
strategies is typically followed. First, some REITs acquire
existing properties, then initiate renovation,
redevelopment, expansion of existing structures and, in some
cases, development of new buildings on vacant land.
Historically, REITs have been able to profit from these
activities (within the confines of the Internal Revenue
Code) by using an advisor or an independent management firm
for day-to-day property management and construction
activities. The second way that REITs have engaged in
development is through the use of joint venture
partnerships. When REITs enter into such partnerships with
independent developers, they can participate in the value
creation process by providing development capital for new
construction in exchange for an equity stake in the final
product. This type of vested interest generally motivates
REIT management to take an active part overseeing the design
development, construction and leasing efforts of the
properties.
Those companies that develop or renovate property under
the REIT format have chosen a traditionally passive
structure to pursue a very non-passive investment strategy,
thus they are interesting cases to study. The REIT offers a
developer wide access to capital in large portions, most
notably through public equity offerings; from that
standpoint it has financial appeal. But the REIT vehicle
also encumbers management with a complex set of
restrictions, set forth by the Internal Revenue Code,
corporate laws at the state level and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. This thesis seeks to identify those
equity and hybrid REITs that create value through real
estate development or renovation, to discuss their rationale
behind choosing REIT status, and to evaluate the successes
and limitations of using the REIT format to facilitate
development. Findings indicate that, in some cases, the
REIT vehicle effectively supports lucrative value-creation
strategies, providing long-term access to capital, a
favorable cost of capital, and adequate operational latitude
to achieve development goals.
From Passive Investor to Active Manager:
A Brief Legislative History of the REIT
The real estate investment trust was created by
Congress in 1960 to permit small investors the opportunity
to invest in professionally managed real estate through
publicly traded securities. REITs are considered by many to
be the mutual funds of the real estate industry. Unlike
other corporate entities, REITs pay no federal income tax on
income or gains passed through to shareholders, provided
that they meet specific organizational and operational
requirements. From an investor's perspective the REIT
permits investment in real estate without the obstacles of
large capital outlays and illiquidity normally associated
with individual property ownership. From management's
perspective the REIT can be a flexible vehicle that permits
a wide array of strategies to invest in virtually any form
of real estate including fee interests, mortgages secured by
real estate, leaseholds, options, and shares in other REITs
or securitized real estate. The REIT vehicle can also serve
as a tool to raise public and private capital, both debt and
equity, to fund investments.
The Ground Rules for REIT Status
The basic organizational requirements have changed only
slightly since 1960. The current requirements are: 1) A
REIT must distribute at least 95% of net taxable earnings to
shareholders; 2) A REIT must be managed by one or more
directors or trustees; 3) During the last half of each
taxable year, no more than 50% of the shares can be owned by
five or fewer individuals; 4) A REIT must report on a
calender year basis; 5) Subject to changes in the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, a REIT must engage independent real estate
professionals (i.e. independent contractors) to carry out
certain management activities; 6) A REIT must have at least
100 shareholders.
Creating a Special Mutual Fund
The original proponents who lobbied for the creation of
the REIT vehicle in the late 1950s were property management
companies wanting to securitize and sell equity interests in
existing-owned properties, with the same tax advantages as
their contemporaries in the mutual fund industry. In
drafting the legislation, Congress made certain that only
the real estate income or "rents from real property," not
profit from property management services, would be exempt
from taxation. The concern was that if a real estate
intensive business, like a hotel for example, elected to
seek REIT status, the proceeds from the hotel operations
could go untaxed.2 To prohibit such loopholes the law
stipulated that a REIT must be a passive investment entity
and not an operating company.
The resulting income requirements of a REIT, as they
stand today, are: 1) "The 75% Income Requirement" which
means that 75% of the gross annual income of a REIT must be
derived from rents from real property, mortgage interest,
gains from sale or other distributions of real property,
dividends or other distributions on and gain from the sale
of shares in other REITs, income and gain from foreclosure
property, or mortgage loan fees. 2) "The 95% Income
Requirement" holds that at least 95% of the annual gross
income must be derived from the items set forth above, plus
other interest, dividends and gains from the sale of stock
and securities. 3) "The 30% Income Limitation" requires
that less than 30% of annual gross income must be derived
from the gains from sale of certain property held less than
four years and short term gains from sale of securities and
other miscellaneous items.
Congress' concern for isolating management income
resulted in casting off the management role from the REIT
itself. The law required that a REIT arrange for the
management of its portfolio holdings by independent
contractors. REITs were also severely restricted from
holding properties for sale after they had been acquired.
This was to insure that gains from speculative sales,
particularly by home building companies, would not escape
taxation. (Even today, after several rounds of legislative
reforms, home builders cannot qualify as a REIT.) Congress
intentionally, perhaps naively, modeled the REIT after the
mutual fund.- This was naive because, unlike a portfolio of
stocks, real estate is a physical asset that requires
intensive property management. The restrictions on
management activities have served as a source of frustration
and, in some cases, litigation for REIT managers ever since.
Only in recent years have REITs been allowed to self-manage
properties and operations. Yet, certain tenant services,
such as interior finish construction and fee automobile
parking, among others, are still forbidden by REIT
regulation.
What a REIT can and cannot do within the letter of the
law is suggested rather than spelled out exactly. Even
attorneys specializing in REIT counsel consider sections
856-860 of the Internal Revenue Code ("The Code") to be
vague on certain points. The strictest interpretation of
the current Code would indicate that REITs, as passive
investment vehicles, are prohibited from directly managing,
operating, much less developing real properties.3 In
practice however a number of REITs are now self-managed,
which means they can lease and operate their own buildings.
Problems Push Reforms in the 1970s
Over time, through subsequent reforms and small
incremental interpretaions of the Code, the REIT has evolved
from a legislative skeleton to a flexible operating entity.
As flexibility increased, REIT managers have also discovered
more creative ways to exploit new opportunities, still
within the confines of the rules. The first major break
came in 1975 when REITs were granted the right to sell
foreclosure properties. Prior to this reform, REITs forced
into a prohibited transaction risked the "sudden death"
penalty, immediate disqualification as a REIT and full
corporate taxation. This and a few other positive reforms
grew out of a negative set of circumstances-- The industry's
major debacle in the early 1970s. During that period many
REITs were forced to foreclose on mortgage and construction
loans. As a result, these REITs suddenly had properties
that they never intended to own; they became equity REITs by
default. The Internal Revenue Code, basically unchanged
since 1960, was so restrictive that the REITs could neither
sell nor effectively manage the properties, without entirely
giving up the shelter of REIT status. By necessity, reforms
recast opportunity in the troubled industry.
A REIT boom period preceded the 1974 bust and its
reforms. Some of the earliest REITs of the 1960s were
organized to invest in first mortgage residential loans,
most of which were insured by the Federal Housing
Administration or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration.
REIT managers soon realized that they could enlarge the
asset base and increase the return to shareholders, from
these relatively secure loan portfolios, through the use of
long-term debt borrowed at a cost less than the rate of
return generated by the mortgage loan holdings. Such use of
leverage allowed REITs to provide geometrically increasing
dividends from quarter to quarter.
As REITs became established as attractive investment
vehicles, the securities market came to expect such
exponential growth. Eventually, the early conservative
portfolios evolved to include construction and development
loans, shorter term mortgages and wrap-around loans.
Attractive short-term borrowing rates led to the financing
of these shorter term portfolio investments through
revolving bank credit, commercial paper and other short-term
debt instruments. Gradually, some REIT managers moved into
equity-oriented investments such as outright ownership of
property, land leaseholds, and joint ventures with real
estate developers, with options to purchase equity or share
in the anticipated appreciation in value of the underlying
property. Many of these basic techniques, born in the
heyday of the boom, are still employed today by development
REITs.
By the early 1970s, in pursuit of the increasingly
higher dividend returns that the securities market now
routinely demanded, REIT managers felt compelled to make
investments with increasingly attractive rates and, in many
cases, increased risks. 4 In 1973 total gross book assets of
REITs grew to exceed $20 billion. During that single year
the industry debt-to-equity ratio rose from 1.7:1 to about
2.5:1. With such heavy allocations of mostly short-term
debt, REITs were extremely vulnerable to changing economic
conditions, particularly those REITs with large
interest-sensitive portfolios of construction and
development loans. When short-term interest rates suddenly
and rapidly increased, REIT portfolios became unprofitable
and their borrowers began to default on mortgages. The
party was over. The middle 1970s saw drastic portfolio
reorganizations and radical measures to reduce short-term
debt and trim unprofitable portfolios. From 1974 to 1975
aggregate REIT assets tumbled from $20 billion to $12
billion and continued declining each year through 1980.5
In the eyes of some investors, the drastic shake out of
the 1970s still tarnishes the reputation of the REIT
industry. Some REIT managers, equity REITs in particular,
performed well through the debacle and have since recovered
to strong financial positions. This industry crisis also
shook Congress into drafting a more flexible statutory
framework. Among other changes, the qualifying income
requirements were relaxed, safe harbor provisions allowed
holding property for sale, difficulties of dealing with
foreclosed property were eased, and late payment of
dividends was no longer penalized by complete
disqualification.6 Prior to the reforms defining qualified
income, a REIT could not so much as sell breath mints in the
building lobby without risking complete disqualification.
These changes helped REITs to attract and retain tenants by
becoming more effective property managers. In 1976, another
legal break was granted when Congress lifted the requirement
that a REIT be organized as a business trust. Now
corporations could qualify for the full tax advantages of
REIT status. Incorporating gave REITs greater operational
flexibility, allowing relief from certain state-level laws
that limited the activities of a business trust.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The next major legislation to impact REITs was the
historic Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86). Most participants
in the real estate industry were hit hard by the loss of
numerous tax deductions that year, however, the competitive
position of the REIT industry was actually enhanced in
basically two ways. First, TRA 86 included several
provisions sought by NAREIT that would grant REITs
additional operational and organizational flexibility and
that would ease start-up problems for REITs. These
provisions included among others, a broadening of services a
REIT could provide to its tenants, and an increase from five
to seven in the number of sales per year a REIT is permitted
without being exposed to the 100% tax on prohibited
transactions. Also, REITs were authorized to conduct
certain operations through wholly owned subsidiaries7 , thus
enjoying liability protection and segmentation within the
portfolio. (In other words, legal actions taken against a
project protected within a subsidiary would not jeopardize
the rest of the portfolio properties.) Finally, the TRA 86
enabled REITs to temporarily invest proceeds from securities
offerings in non-real estate investments while negotiating
long term investments or development projects.
The second and indirect way that TRA 86 strengthened
REITs was by basically eliminating a good portion of their
competition-- the real estate syndicators, master limited
partnerships and other publicly traded partnerships. These
competing securitized investment vehicles relied on
depreciation write-offs, investment tax credits, and the
flow through of tax losses to enhance the financial returns
to investors. In contrast, REITs were never permitted to
pass through tax losses, only taxable income. So, when
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legislation wiped out the benefits of such tax losses, the
competition all but vanished, and REITs were left standing
relatively favored under the new federal tax policy.
By the mid 1980s certain REITs created their own
in-house, independent management firms. In practice, the
only thing that made these internal management companies
independent was a separate payroll to satisfy the letter of
the law. The duties that these subsidiaries performed
included leasing, property management, and construction
supervision. Such tasks were not unlike those handled by
private real estate development firms. In the last two
years several REITs have been granted Private Letter Rulings
from the IRS that permit such wholly owned "independent"
management firms to be liquidated and absorbed by the trust.
As legislators and investors have grown more familiar with
real estate investments, REITs have been granted more and
more autonomy. The rulings suggest that the IRS now
consents that certain aspects of property management are an
integral function of real estate ownership; renovation and
redevelopment of portfolio properties, for example.
Fee-driven development or development for immediate sale is
not, and never has been, permissible. Through joint venture
partnerships, however, REITs can reap the value added
through development, provided that the REIT holds the
property in its own portfolio for the four year minimum
required by the Code. In these ways, REITs offer incredible
flexibility in the types of assets and business strategies
they can pursue, despite the technical tax restrictions on
operations.
The REIT as a Source of Capital
Even in light of favorable changes in the tax code and
more flexible private rulings, development is a more complex
process using the REIT vehicle instead of a private company.
REITs are laden with additional regulations and an added
layer of management concerns. Aside from the tax
advantages, the primary incentive for a developer to choose
this path is for access to equity capital through
securitization.
The development process generally requires outside
sources of capital. Prior to 1986 developers could rely
primarily on debt capital, which was then plentiful, to fund
projects. When TRA '86 removed the incentive to maximize
leverage, equity became a more important component to deal
structures. Some portion of equity, or gap capital, is
required by developers and entrepreneurs. A REIT is a
potential source for such equity capital.
In the late 1980s access to traditional debt sources
also became restricted. Due to current soft, overbuilt
conditions in real estate markets, high vacancy rates , and
overleveraged real estate deals of the recent past lenders
(and watchful federal regulators) are particularly cautious
of further real estate investment. The well publicized
problems in the industry have created a generally
unfavorable attitude toward real estate. REITs, however,
can place debt capital without appeasing federal bank
regulators. Additionally, through the use of participating
mortgages and convertible debt instruments, the line between
debt and equity has become blurred since the mid 1980s. 8
Today's equity instruments organized under joint venture
agreements can be tailored specifically to meet the needs of
the investor and to cover the front-end cash drains of the
development activity. And the REIT vehicle is flexible
enough to provide capital for development under almost any
conceivable deal structure.
Development REITs can be borrowers too. Wiser from the
1974 debacle, many REITs use measured degrees of leverage to
strengthen their capital structures through conventional
bank debt and long-term mortgages. REITs can also employ
the techniques of corporate finance to issue debt
instruments such as convertible debentures and warrants.
These sources can be sometimes be obtained at very
attractive rates. The REIT is a potential source of debt,
equity and "hybrid" capital.
But commitment to the REIT format should not be entered
lightly. Once established, a public company must answer to
shareholders each and every quarter. A company that plans
to sell stock periodically to raise capital must strive to
keep the value of the stock high. Faltering distributions
and declining stock values can tarnish a REIT's market
reputation and impair a firm's ability to raise capital for
years. Is the real estate development business, with its
high risks and long lead time, well suited to public
ownership? Have REITs been employed to successfully develop
real estate? Or is the REIT vehicle too cumbersome to allow
for timely, decisive entrepreneurial action? Can operation
as a REIT be an effective long-term strategy for value
creation? What are the trade-offs a firm must endure to
have access to public funds? Do REITs enjoy a lower cost of
capital than other private firms?
There are only a few REITs in the market to serve as
case studies whose activities and experiences can provide
answers. Chapter Two discusses the advantages and trade
offs of pursuing value-creation investment strategies as a
REIT. It identifies actual development REITs and describes
their various real estate activities. The two major
strategies for value creation, "Acquisition & Redevelopment"
versus "Joint Venture Development Partnership," are
discussed in more detail. of thirteen value creation REITs
identified in the course of research for this paper, six
were selected for closer study: Copley Properties, Federal
Realty Investment Trust, ICM Property Investors, IRT
Property Company, MSA Realty and New Plan Realty. The
remainder are noted as points of comparison and contrast.
Discussion in the following chapters will demonstrate that
NAREIT's categories mask broad differences in investment
strategies.
Chapter Three focuses on the performance of the six
case-study REITs and presents empirical evidence to
demonstrate that the younger Joint Venture REITs have faced
internal and external difficulties which have marred
20
performance, while the Acquisition & Redevelopment REITs
have performed more favorably. Performance is evaluated in
several ways-- ability to raise capital, to develop
property, to manage property and produce cash flow, as well
as financial risks and returns as securities. The fourth
and final chapter presents the conclusions of the study and
an outlook toward future uses of REITs in the development
process.
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TABLE 1.1
THE VALUE-CREATION REITS: NAREIT Categories
EQUITY REITS HYBRID REITS
Chicago Dock & Canal Trust Copley Properties, Inc.
Federal Realty Trust 1CM Property Investors
IRT Property Company MIP Properties
MSA Realty Trust Western Investment Trust
New Plan Realty Trust
PCA/Sammis Industrial Fund
PCA/Tishman Speyer, Inc.
United Dominion Realty Trust
Weingarten Realty Investors
Source: REIT Facts, NAREIT, 1988
TABLE 1.2
THE VALUE-CREATION REITS:
Reclassified by Investment Strategy
ACQUISITION & JOINT VENTURE DEVELOPMENT
REDEVELOPMENT REITS: PARTNERSHIP REITS:
---------------------------- -------------------------
Federal Realty Trust Copley Properties, Inc.
IRT Property Company 1CM Property Investors
New Plan Realty Trust Mortgage Investments Plus
United Dominion Realty Trust MSA Realty Trust
Weingarten Realty Investors
Western Investment Trust
PRIVATE REITS:
PCA/Sammis Industrial Fund
PCA/Tishman Speyer, Inc.
Bold type: Indicates the six case study REITs examined in
Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER TWO
UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENT EQUITY REITs
"The greatest advantage to being a REIT is our
access to capital; everything else is a
disadvantage. . . Is a REIT the right way to run
our business? We ask ourselves that question
every day."
Robert Wennett, Vice President-
Acquisitions, Federal Realty
Investment Trust (June 4, 1989)
Given the volume and complexity of restrictions that
apply to a REIT, one has to wonder why an entreprenurial
company would choose such a regulated business structure.
There are some distinct advantages, but they come with
disclaimers, exceptions, trade-offs, and other strings
attached to public corporate ownership. The following
section highlights some of the pros and cons of value
creation as a REIT. Wherever possible, actual experiences
of the case-study REITs are cited to provide examples. It
lends context to the subsequent section of the chapter
which presents the two primary value creation strategies
currently in use.
Advantages of the REIT Format
Pass-through Taxation
Tax exemption is the fundamental advantage of the REIT
format. Technically the REIT, as defined by the Internal
Revenue Code, is a taxable entity. However, no corporate
taxes have to be paid when 95% of net taxable income is
distributed and the other income tests are fulfilled.
Investment in a REIT offers tax advantages particularly
beneficial to tax-exempt and nonprofit institutional
shareholders, such as pension plans. Certain nonprofits
are prohibited from investing directly in debt financed
property. The REIT provides an opportunity for these
groups to invest in leveraged real estate without penalty.
Access to Capital
This is perhaps the most obvious overriding incentive
for a development or investment entity to seek REIT status.
The ability for a developer or development partner to sell
common stock to literally thousands of individual investors
in a single public offering serves as an attractive
prospect, offsetting the array of operational headaches.
Furthermore, this competitive advantage of access to common
equity does not preclude a REIT from access to traditional
sources of funds. Long term debt, short term lines of
credit, joint-venture partnerships with institutional
sources and other forms of private placement are all used
by REITs. Primary choices for capital include:
Equity Sources:
Common Stock: Common equity, compared to alternative
debt sources, is the most expensive source of capital
available to a REIT. Underwriting and printing costs
are high and new shares typically trade at a discount
from the appraised value of the underlying real
estate. Relative to other, private sources of
equity, however, certain REITs enjoy a comparatively
low cost of capital through the issuance of stock.
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Joint Venture Partnerships: REITs that are not large
enough to invest in any one particular project can
enter joint venture partnerships with institutions to
effectively pool their equity. Certain institutional
investors perceive REIT stock ownership to be more of
a stock market investment than true real estate
ownership. Such institutions would prefer the joint
venture partnership over common stock ownership. (A
REIT's motivation for this type of joint venture is
to place capital and should not be confused developer
joint venture partnerships, where the developer
typically brings expertise and seeks capital.)
Debt Sources
Convertible Debentures: In effect, the REIT borrows
money from the investor at an attractive interest
rate, pays coupon rate interest until a specified
future conversion date, and then pays the principal
back with a predetermined number of common stock
shares. These are categorized as debt capital until
after conversion to equity. Most REIT managers
surveyed prefer the use of this versatile instrument.
They can be public or private placements, trade in
foreign currencies on foreign exchanges, and in some
cases can be issued without costly SEC filings and
approvals.
Debt: REITs have access to virtually all forms of
traditional debt capital, from short-term bank lines
of credit to fixed-rate mortgage loans from
institutional sources. Access to debt in general is
important to cover unexpected drops in cash flow.
Since distributions are mandatory, REITs cannot
retain their earnings. Short-term borrowings are
frequently used to bridge negative cash flows. Long
term debt can be used to free up capital in completed
projects in order to fund new developments. Too much
debt on the balance sheet, however, will be perceived
as a risk in the market and could reduce the price of
the stock.
Leases: Real estate leases can give a REIT the same
end result as debt, the use of land or improvements
at the cost of incremental long-term payments.
Cost of Capital
Virtually all public REITs are established with the
desire of gaining access to low cost equity capital. In
prabtice, however, only certain REITs ever actually enjoy
this competitive advantage. In simplified terms, the cost
of common equity is equal to the dividends that a
corporation must pay for all equity shares outstanding. At
any point in time then, a simple measure of cost would be
the current dividend payment divided by the current market
price of the stock. Financial analysts call this ratio the
current yield. It is not a true measure of the total cost
of equity since it ignores the fixed underwriting, printing
and marketing costs of a public offering, but it serves as
a basis for compariing stocks.Even though all three
companies in Exhibit 2.1 pay annual dividends of $1.00,
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EXHIBIT 2.1
THE CONCEPT OF CURRENT YIELD
Current
Dividend Price Yield
Stock A: $1.00 $8.33 12.0%
Stock B: 1.00 10.00 10.0%
Stock C: 1.00 12.50 8.0%
Company C has a lower cost of equity capital since each
dividend dollar buys the use of $12.50, whereas Company A
only gets $8.33. To make a profit, Company A must reinvest
their equity capital in something that will bring a return
higher than the 12% current yield. Company C needs only an
8% hurdle rate to profitably reinvest. Clearly, given
equal distributions, the stock with the higher share price
has a lower potential cost of equity capital.
As Exhibit 2.2 illustrates, the A&R group enjoys a
lower current yield than the Joint Venture group. In the
case of an equity real estate company, market price per
share reflects arguably two things: first, the underlying
value of the real estate and second, the performance of the
income component of the return, dividends, over time.
Dividends are a product of cash flow which, for a REIT, is
derived from net operating, or rental, income. Intuitively
then, a REITthat offers competitive dividends and owns a
sizeable portfolio of income-producing property should
boast a higher market price per share, and a lower
currentyield. This raises an important distinction between
our two groups of development REITs. Those in the Joint
Venture group started business with little or no income
EXHIBIT 2.2
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL CURRENT YIELDS
Annual Current
REIT Dividend Price Yield
Joint Venture REITs
Copley Properties $1.44 $12.00 12.0%
ICM Property Inv. 0.48 7.63 6.3%*
MIP Properties 0.40 3.75 10.7%
MSA Realty 0.60 6.00 10.0%
Acquis. & Redevelopment REITs
Federal Realty $1.40 $20.25 6.9%
IRT Property Co. 1.16 11.25 10.3%
New Plan 1.08 17.25 6.3%
United Dominion 1.24 16.13 7.7%
Source: Wall Street Journal
Notes: Prices on June 29,1990. Dividends reflect total
distributions, previous twelve months.
* ICM lowered its quarterly dividend from .34 to .12
in second quarter of 1989. Current yield at the
old rate ,annualized, would be 17.82%.
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producing properties; cash flow was anticipated and
subsidized during the interim development period, through
the use of debt, by the joint venture. In contrast, over
the same period of time, mid 1980s to the present, the A&R
REITs subsidized their development efforts with the rental
income of accumulated portfolios of property.
The Acquisition & Redevelopment REITs have been able
to raise equity capital at very attractive rates. On
occasion, New Plan Realty for example, was able to profit
by temporarily reinvesting the money into government
securities, a virtually risk-free investment. Since the
initial offerings of Copley, ICM, and MSA, however, none
have been able to make any subsequent equity offerings
because falling stock prices have pushed up current yields
to levels that would not justify reinvestment in real
estate development. A low cost source of equity capital is
a desired advantage of the REIT format, but not a
certainty.
Flexibility
Most REITs can operate in any state or city where
management perceives an opportunity. REITs can acquire or
develop any desired property types and enter partnership
agreements with virtually any developer, institution, or
other entity, as long as those agreements are carefully
structured so that the proceeds from partnerships do not
violate the income tests of the Code. Copley Properties,
Inc. and ICM Property Investors, for example, have
diversified by investing in office and industrial
properties in several metropolitan areas across the country
with many different development partners. MSA Realty, on
the other hand, has a very specialized and concentrated
investment plan of investing only in retail projects
located in the midwestern United States, and only in joint
venture partnerships with its sponsor, Melvin Simon &
Associates, Inc. as developer.
One limitation the format imposes is that REITs cannot
be "dealers" holding developed property for sale, as in the
case of, say, a single-family home builder. Even so, the
flexibility of the format does not prevent a REIT from
profiting indirectly from that sort of activity when the
opportunity arises. In 1978 the portfolio of Federal
Realty, for example, was about 60% shopping centers and 40%
apartments; today management describe the portfolio a
shopping center REIT which still owns one apartment
complex. A quick sell off of apartments in the mid 1980s
resulted from an unforeseen market opportunity for windfall
profits. Though REIT limitations prohibited the company
from converting these apartments into condos, inflation and
tax changes in the mid-1980s stimulated such conversions
and drove up the demand for apartment assets. Federal
elected to sell their apartment holdings earlier than
originally planned to take advantage of the inflated prices
offered by condo converters. Thus the REIT format still
allowed Federal to profit from trends in the changing
market, but left the prohibited retail sales activities to
the buyer. Such creativity permits REITs to take advantage
of almost any market opportunity available to other real
estate concerns.
Unique Market Opportunities
Because a REIT is motivated by different tax and
financial objectives it can sometimes structure property
transactions that would not be feasible to other developers
or investors. Using Federal Realty again as an example,
prior to 1986 the company would, in effect, package and
sell off depreciation deductions to buyers that were
taxable entities, because REITs were unable to pass through
to shareholders the benefits of the losses which, prior to
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, were deductible from regular
income. The REIT format allowed shareholders to realize
the value of those tax losses, although indirectly.
More recently, Federal Realty acquired control of
seven shopping centers through a 49-year leasehold rather
than a fee-simple purchase. The lessor was an older
individual who wanted to dispose of the property but avoid
the capital gains and estate taxes that would be levied on
the proceeds of a sale. Competing buyers would have
preferred to purchase property, with leverage, and use the
interest payments and depreciation expenses to reduce
taxable income. Because REITs are not required to pay
taxes, Federal could evaluate this transaction solely on a
cash-flow basis. (REITs are required to distribute 95% of
net taxable income but are actually able to distribute up
to the entire before-tax cash flow.) Upon settlement of the
seller's estate, Federal Realty's management anticipates
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buying the property outright (prior to the end of the
lease) and intends to exercise its redevelopment and
expansion strategies on the leased properties, just as if
they were owned.
Disadvantages of the REIT Format
Barriers to Entry
Firms that wish to establish a new REIT face
substantial barriers to entry. Initial Public Offerings
(IPOs) are very expensive and complex procedures, much more
expensive than subsequent equity offerings. Underwriting,
printing, and other costs for IPOs run about 14% to 15% of
the total offering amount; compared to 51% to 6% for
subsequent common equity offerings.9  Further, once new
securities reach the market, most tend to quickly fall
below their original offering price. Of 17 initial public
offerings in 1985, only three were trading above their
original price one year later.10 ICM Property Investors'
common stock, for example, has never traded above the 1985
initial offering price of $20.00 per share. From a
financial management standpoint, no additional equity
offerings can take place until after this period of
depressed value has passed. Typically, a stock must
demonstrate a track record of performance before new
investors will support another offering.
Operational Expenses
Aside from start up costs, routine operating expenses
are also high. Operating a REIT requires an additional
layer of management beyond the scope of a traditional
private development company. As a result of these high
inherent fixed costs, another crucial factor in setting up
a REIT is size. The smaller REIT in public form is a very
costly way to do business. There are smaller trusts, but
most industry analysts believe that without a threshold of
about $100 million in assets11 , it is disproportionately
expensive to produce SEC reports, quarterly shareholder
reports, and an investor-communications program. These
overhead expenses must be compensated by higher project
returns.
Stock Market Valuation
Another potential stumbling block for new and
established REITs alike is that the performance criteria of
the stock market may conflict with the real estate market.
Ideally, the price of a real estate equity security should
simply reflect the value of the underlying securitized real
estate; this is seldom the case. While it is true that
dividend income streams relate directly to the cash flows
earned by the held real estate, REIT shares are truly
hybrid securities whose price movements correlate highly
with those of the stock market.12  REIT management may
identify attractive development opportunities at a time
when its stock values are depressed for reasons unrelated
to the real estate market or value of assets. At the end
of 1989, for instance, the appraised value per share of
Copley Properties was $22.04 while each share traded for
about $12.00. So, in a public offering, Copley would have
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received about $0.54 for each dollar of their real estate
portfolio sold. Obviously, this situation impairs the
REIT's ability to raise capital in a timely manner.
Constant Capital Recuirements
In order to grow, a REIT must become a constant
consumer of capital. Due to the requirement that REITs
distribute 95% of taxable income, growth must be
accommodated through new capital as opposed to utilizing
retained earnings, which would be much less costly. So,
even though the cost of capital may be lower, the frequency
with which a REIT must buy capital is higher than some of
its competitors.
Dependence on Cash Flow
For a REIT to have access to the capital markets it
must maintain a favorable stock performance, in terms of
growth and income. Traditional developers can and will
tolerate negative cash flows associated with the
construction and lease-up periods of a project in
anticipation of favorable long-term returns. Certain
shareholders may understand the rationale behind such a
strategy, but the stock market at large will not tolerate
decreasing dividends for any length of time. This
intolerance is reflected in lower market value of the
stock. Joint Venture REITs, in particular, must either
endure depressed stock values during development periods or
find alternate sources of income to offset the low cash
flows.
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Limitations on Capital Structure
Like other development entities REITs can take on debt,
employing leverage to enhance returns. Debt is less costly
to a REIT in the short run due to lower underwriting costs,
and in the long run interest payments are generally less
costly than dividends. But leverage equates to risk; if
REITs employ too much debt then the market will discount
the value of the stock to offset the risk of leverage.
Lower stock prices limit the REIT's ability to borrow and
to raise additional equity capital. The market,
specifically rating agencies, can effectively limit the
acceptable debt-to-equity ratio for a REIT. Federal
Realty, one of the most highly leveraged public REITs,
maintains an ongoing dialogue with rating agencies, such as
Standard and Poor's and Moody's. Federal's management
claims that agencies' threats of lower ratings are a major
influence to raise additional equity. If a rating agency
lowers its grade, a stock's market value will likely fall,
resulting in a higher cost of equity, and thus offset the
advantage of leverage.
Limitations on Portfolio Turnover
To insure against speculative and short-term trading,no
more than 30% of a REIT's gross income may be gains from
the sale of property held for less than four years
(excluding gains from foreclosure). There are occasions,
often unforeseen, when an early sale of a project may be in
the best interest of the shareholders. This restriction
can hinder a REIT's ability to maximize profits. Gains
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from such disallowed transactions are taxable and forfeited
100% to the IRS. The alternative to the stiff payment is
to surrender REIT status.
Takeover Risks
Because security values typically trade at a discount
from the fair market value of the underlying real estate,
REITs are susceptible to hostile takeover attempts by other
real estate investors. There are certain strategic
covenants that REITs can employ to protect against large
volume stock purchases. For example, provisions can be
built in to the organizational documents to restrict the
transfer of shares, so that 50% of the outstanding shares
cannot fall into the hands of five or fewer individuals.
Some REITs reserve the right to issue special preferred
stock, enabling the company to place a large block of
voting shares into friendly hands.13
In summary, the sum total of advantages and
disadvantages of pursuing real estate development through
the REIT vehicle is positive only under certain
circumstances. Running a real estate business and running
a publicly held corporation present management with
conflicting goals. The business of real estate development
requires construction capital outlays at the front end,
relentless debt service payments, no rental income during
the development period and limited income during the
lease-up period. After a ride on that roller coaster, the
developer's desired end result is a steady stream of cash
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flow from a fully operating structure, whose value is worth
more than its original cost. To reach the desired end,
developers must tolerate low or negative cash flows, now,
for attractive income streams later. Developers are
accustomed to that trade off; common equity shareholders
are not. The business of running a publicly held
income-oriented development corporation (a value-creation
REIT) requires a steady stream of increasing cash flows.
This implies a paradox that would make "real estate
development" and "publicly held securities" seem mutually
exclusive.
The market for income stocks demands immediate
gratification in the form of dividends, or distributions
per share. Investors will pay more for a proven source of
dividend income, raising the market price of the stock. If
the value-creation REIT is to serve as a well from which to
draw capital, the value per share must be enhanced over
time, or the well may run dry. Chapter Three will
illustrate that this was largely the case among the Joint
Venture case study REITs. If share value is to be
maintained, REITs involved in the development process must
find ways to supplement inherent negative cash flows. This
is especially true in an uncertain leasing market. The
Acquisition and Development REITs have relied on large
portfolios of existing properties to fund dividends and
cash drains of renovation projects.
Development as a REIT: Two Approaches
The REITs chosen for this analysis were selected to
illustrate the various ways that the REIT vehicle can be
used to facilitate the development of real estate. There
are two notable basic strategies: the joint venture equity
partnership with independent developers, and the strategy
of acquisition, redevelopment and/or expansion of existing
built property. Some REITs employ a combination of both
strategies, but the companies selected for study have
historically demonstrated a preference for one approach
over the other. The remainder of this chapter, as well as
Chapter Three, will focus primarily on the six case studies
profiled in Exhibit 2.3.
Within the context of these two fundamental investment
strategies there are a variety of ways that individual
REITs can further differentiate themselves from one
another. The important characteristics of a REIT's
individual strategy include the type and diversity of
investment property; the size of the real estate portfolio;
the percentage of the portfolio under development at any
one time; the capital structure or use of leverage; and the
means employed to access new debt and equity capital.
Logically, age of the REIT will also have an impact on the
portfolio size-- building a portfolio of real estate takes
time. Further, the climate of the real estate market at
the inception of a REIT may have had significant influence
on the chosen development agenda.
EXHIBIT 2.3: THE CASE STUDY REITS
JOINT VENTURE EQUITY PARTNERSHIP REITS
Name of REIT:
Copley Properties,
Inc.
Year Real Estate Capital
Founded: Portfolio: Structure: Description:
1985 $68,098,507 Assets Debt-to-Equity Company invests in to-be-built
12 Properties 0.1:1 properties with a number of developers
as an equity partner or a lender with an
Warehouse 73.7% Debt 8% equity option in the completed project.
Office 11.6% Conv. Debent. 0% Projects are Located in several
R&D 10.4% Equity 92% geographically diverse markets in the
Residential 4.3% U.S.
ICM Property 1985 $131,077,000 Assets Debt-to-Equity ICM invests as a general partner in
Investors 11 Properties 1.0:1 joint venture partnerships with a number
u. Incoroporated
Office/R&D 100% Debt 51%
Conv. Debent.
Equity 49%
of developers in geographically
diversified markets. The trust wholly
owns two properties. Presently
negotiating a stock-for-property
purchase of an existing industrial
portfolio.
MSA Realty 1984 $79,410,043 Assets Debt-to-Equity The company invests as a general partner
Corporation 18 Properties 0.7:1 in joint venture partnerships with
Melvin Simon & Associates,Inc.,
Shopping Centers 100% Debt 27% exclusively. MSA typically contributes
Conv. Debent. 15% all of the capital required by each
Equity 58% joint venture to develop, acquire and/or
expand a shopping center. The company
has right of first refusal to invest in
any properties Melvin Simon & associates
proposes to acquire or develop.
Sources: 1989 annual reports and NAREIT Fact Book.
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EXHIBIT 2.3: THE CASE STUDY REITS (continued)
ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT/REDEVELOPMENT REITS
Name of REIT:
Federal Realty
Investment Trust
Year
Founded:
1962
Real Estate Capital
Portfolio: Structure: Description:
------ ------- -- -------- ---- -----------------------------------------------------
$514,552,000 Assets Debt-to-Equity Federal invests primarily in prime community and
43 Properties 2.9:1 neighborhood shopping centers. The redevelopment
Shopping Centers 99.1%
Apartments .9%
Debt 46%
Conv. Debent. 28%
Equity 25%
IRT Property 1979 $150,455,715 Assets Debt-to-Equity
Company 71 Properties 1.3:1
Shopping Centers 88%
Apartments 9%
Industrial 2%
Other 1%
Debt 44.0%
Conv. Debentures 12.6%
Equity 43.4%
strategy is to upgrade older centers in prime locations
through reconfiguration, expansion and modifying tenant
mix. The company does its own property management and
leasing.
Real estate investments consist principally of
neighborhood and community shopping centers, located in
the Southeastern United States and anchored by major
grocery, drug and variety stores. IRT renovates,
expands, manages and leases acquired properties. The
company also participates in development as a
construction lender on new projects. IRT oversees
design and construction, participates in anchor tenant
lease negotiations and controls leasing standards and
rates.
New Plan Realty 1962 $116,518,612 Assets Debt-to-Equity New Plan Realty Trust evolved from New Plan Realty
Trust 59 Properties 0.1:1 Corp., a pooled real estate investment vehicle founded
REIT by Morris B. Newman that first went public in 1962.
Since Shopping Centers 60% Debt 8.7% Newman family members still direct the REIT, which is
1972 Cash and Securities 25% Conv. Debentures 0.3% primarily an equity owner of fee and leasehold
Apartments 6% Equity 91.0% interests in income producing real properties.The
Real Estate Securities 5% investment strategy is to purchase seasoned well
Other Real Estate 4% Located shopping centers and apartment complexes, at a
discount to replacement costs, and seek to achieve
income growth through a program of expansion,
renovation, re-leasing and/or re-merchandising.
Sources: 1989 annual reports and NAREIT Fact Book.
The Joint Venture REITS
1985 was a record setting year for the REIT industry.
With 29 initial public offerings totaling $ 2.9 billion,
industry followers nicknamed this group the Class of '85.
REITs had become quite popular and the real estate
development business was booming. In this thriving
mid-1980s market, all three of the Joint Venture REITs
issued their initial public stock, each without the benefit
of an established real estate portfolio.
Traditional equity REITs invest in proven, existing
income-producing property. Most of the underlying value of
their stock is attributable to cash flow generated from the
steady flow of rental income, less operating, investing and
financing expenses. Unlike traditional equity REITs,
development REITs set out to capture the value created
immediately when a new building leases up, making the
transition from a construction project to a cash flow
generator. To achieve the desired results the Joint
Venture REITs rely on the expertise and abilities of the
developer partner to identify the opportunity, build, lease
and manage the project. As a money partner, the REIT can
monitor and influence these efforts but they are clearly
not internal functions of the company.
Copley Properties, Inc.
Copley Properties typifies the general strategy
representative of this group. Its founders envisioned that
the underlying value of the common stock would increase as
a result of increased asset value realized through the
development process. At the outset, management
specifically targeted real estate development as a key part
of their investment strategy. Funding real property in its
development phase, they reasoned, would enable Copley to
invest at the cost of raw land and improvements rather than
at the retail price, or fair market value of fully
developed real estate. The Company anticipated that the
resulting appreciation would enable it, through
refinancings, to invest additional capital in future
development projects while retaining its interests in the
original deals. The bylaws of the company were set up to
limit the use of leverage to no more than 300% of the net
book assets. The Copley prospectus represented that sale
of each property would generally occur between 8 and 12
years after the original investment. REITs are prohibited
from "flipping" property or acting as dealers by the 30%
Income Test (as described in Chapter 1), but Copley
anticipated long-term profit from appreciation would be
realized through capital gains.
The investment strategy chosen for the REIT was
intentionally identical to the investment strategy
successfully employed by the advisor, Copley Real Estate
Advisors, Inc., since its inception in 1982. The REIT
format was chosen to provide a market for small investors
to participate in the same sort of investments that had
been previously available only to pension funds and
institutions. At the inception of the REIT in 1985, the
advisor also believed that securitized real estate was an
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important area for the company to diversify into. In
addition, management of the REIT served as a source of fee
revenue for the advisor.
Capitalization of the joint ventures is typically in
the form of a construction loan at the beginning of a
project with an option to acquire an equity position when
the building is completed. In a routine example, Copley
would loan $10 million to construct an 80,000-square foot
office/R & D building and at the same time, for $100,000,
purchase an option to acquire a 60% limited partnership
when the building was completed. Excercising the option
and buying the partnership position would cost another $2
million. Interest on the construction money and equity
returns ran at about 12%. Copley also funded development
buy purchasing land and then leasing it back to the seller,
with ground rent based on a fixed amount plus some portion
of the gross receipts. In a typical 60-year lease, ground
rent base payments resembled debt service amortized at
about 12%, and additional rent equaled 50% of gross rental
reciepts after rent payments.
ICM Propety Investors
The strategy for ICM Propety Investors was similar to
that of Copley Properties. Although in their first year of
operations, besides investing in joint venture development
projects, ICM paid all cash to purchase two new office
buildings, independently. (The seller assumed the risk in
the lease-up period and gauranteed a minimum level of cash
flow by "master-leasing" the entire buildings for three
years.) ICM categorizes their two types of joint venture
partnerships as "mortgage-equity" joint ventures and
"equity gap" funding joint ventures. In the former, ICM as
a general partner provides first mortgage financing and an
equity contribution to the partnership holding the real
estate. In an equity-gap joint venture, the company and a
developer form a partnership with each party as a general
partner. To this partnership, the developer contributes
the property, subject to existing third party financing,
and ICM makes an initial equity contribution in exchange
for a preferred interest in the venture. ICM stipulates
that its own required return must be paid before any funds
are distributed to the developer-partner. ICM also has a
priority interest in the sale of the property. In an
effort to boost lagging cash flow ICM is presently
negotiating a stock-for-property purchase of several
existing industrial properties from a west coast developer.
This will be discussed further in later chapters.
MSA Realty
MSA Realty provides an important contrast to the other
Joint Venture REITs, for two reasons. First, the company
invests in community shopping centers and regional malls,
as opposed to office and industrial properties and second,
the sponsor of this REIT is a developer. In fact, three
wholly owned subsidiaries of Melvin Simon & Associates
provide staff for the REIT's entire scope of operations:
the investment advisor, the development company, and the
management company. All MSA projects are developed by
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Melvin Simon & Associates and the REIT has had right of
first refusal to participate in any project undertaken by
the sponsor. Projects are funded by the REIT through
capital contributions or by guarantees of construction
loans; MSA routinely provides all capital required by a
joint venture in exchange for preffered returns during the
construction period and an equity postion in the finished
product ranging from 42.5% to 50%.
MSA was founded in 1984 with the stated intention of
qualifying as a REIT, but due to an excess of short-term
investments, did not attain REIT status until the 1987 tax
year. After six years of limited leasing success, the
company is presently trying to liquidate and again may face
disqualification as a REIT. Nevertheless, the company has
participated in the development of 18 community shopping
centers, each one a seperate joint venture partnership with
the same developer, totaling over 4.5 million square feet
of space, significantly more than the other two Joint
Venture REITs studied. MSA's leasing difficulties and cash
flow shortages (presented in the following chapter)
illustrate that the recent problems in the real estate
market were not limited only to office and industrial
properties. Historically, the older equity REITs with
concentrated retail portfolios, like Federal Realty and New
Plan, have weathered previous recessions comparatively
well. 14 MSA's short history would indicate that
concentrated retail holdings, alone, do not insure success.
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The Acquisition & Redevelopment REITs
"Renovations and modernizations do not
automatically create additional income - this
must come from new leases. Our expansion
programs must be complete and paid for before
these stores can be leased and produce income.
Although future cash flows can be expected and
the portfolio enhanced by these additions,
increases in cash flow from these programs may
not be immediately reflected."
Donald MacLeod, Chairman of IRT
Property Company (1989, Annual
Report to Shareholders)
These companies invest primarily in shopping centers,
some with diversification in apartments and industrial
properties. Renovation efforts generally happen
immediately after the acquisition of a property and, for a
typical community center, can be completed within a year.
Reconfiguration can be quite extensive, phased if
necessary, with substantial additions to rentable area.
Upon completion, these projects are indistinguishable from
new construction. Then the second part of the strategy is
to re-tenant the space with those merchants that will
attract the most business.
While the Joint Venture category of REITs each started
their operations from scratch with a stated strategy to
build the portfolio through development, the Acquisition &
Redevelopment REITs typically evolved into active
developers, adding value to purchased properties through
renovation. Development strategies in this group grew out
of day-to-day management activities of existing income
properties. owners realized that, if the location was
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right, aesthetic and functional improvements to an older
shopping center would attract better retail tenants and
generate higher rents. The acquisition price of an older
shopping center, or apartment complex, would be
substantially lower than the market value after renovation,
expansion, and re-tenanting. Typically, the companies in
this category follow an investment strategy focused on
building and holding an income-producing portfolio;
development and redevelopment efforts are a supplemental
means to that end.
Some of these REITs have, in addition to their
renovation and expansion efforts, ventured into ground-up
development of new projects. Weingarten Realty Investors,
for example, holds vacant land in their portfolio with the
expressed intention of constructing new retail centers as
market conditions permit. IRT, through joint venture
partnerships with developers, has built new shopping
centers and taken an active role in overseeing their design
and construction. United Dominion also has independently
developed new industrial buildings from the ground up.
Federal Realty added a 5-story hotel on the site of their
275,000-square foot Grovenor Plaza. Hotel operation is
forbidden by a REIT, so the company structured a ground
lease for that portion of the site. Also, it receives all
rental income from the 10,000-square feet of lobby retail.
Development, redevelopment, and market repositioning
activities all add value to the properties. Within this
group of REITs, however, that value is usually passed on to
shareholders through dividend income from higher rents,
rather than gains from higher sales prices. This bias
toward cash flow and long-term ownership over disposition
transactions distinguishes the A&R REITs from the Joint
Venture group in another way. These REITs employ their own
property management forces, rather than relying on a
development partner to handle initial leasing and
management. In August 1988, for example, when New Plan
absorbed its long-time independent agent, it became the
first listed REIT to be self administered and self-managed.
Ironically, the very first REITs of 1960 were established
by property management companies, with themselves as
independent contractors. Yet it was not until New Plan's
conversion that the IRS formally recognized property
management as an integral function of real estate
ownership, and thus permissible by a REIT. In 1989 and
1990 respectively, Federal Realty and IRT Property Company
each received Private Letter Rulings from the IRS to
directly self-manage their properties. Federal Realty's
extensive internal operations include separate divisions in
Leasing, Marketing, Development, Property Management, and
Acquisitions. Even in cases where management is, or was,
handled through independent contractors, the relationship
is usually very close and exclusive of any other management
clients.
Other Applications of REITs in the Development Process
There are other REITs that participate in the
development of property and offer unique differences worthy
of mention, even though they fall outside my proposed
typology. Property Capital Trust (PCT), for example,
represents another strategy that is very similar to those
of the listed joint venture group. Since the late 1960s
this equity REIT has worked in close contact with
developers on certain new projects for addition to the
portfolio. The key difference is that PCT has
traditionally avoided development construction risk and
funded projects only upon approved completion, as a
permanent lender or equity owner. Construction loans were
funded from other sources. PCT also only funded these
long-term investments subject to minimum occupancy so that
the developer would bear the initial leasing risks.
REITs have been utilized in other ways, most notably
by developers, to provide liquidity for their portfolio.
Instead of raising common stock equity prior to starting
development projects, some developers have established
equity REITs to cash out of completed properties, while
retaining a financial interest through the fee-generating
management of the property. Through this strategy
developers, who have traditionally done private placements
rather than public offerings, gain a foothold in the
public-securities market. Lincoln N.C. Realty Fund and
Trammell Crow Real Estate Investors, for example, were
designed to serve this purpose.15
Chicago Dock & Canal Trust is a unique development
REIT that seems to deny classification. While it has
entered joint venture partnerships with developers, this
REIT has assumed, on its own, some of the most challenging
tasks of the process-- masterplanning, obtaining city
approvals, and developing infrastructure for a major
downtown development site. This trust is also unusual in
that most of its assets are tied up in undeveloped or
underdeveloped land. Chicago Dock's original land holding,
a 46-acre tract that stretches along the north bank of the
Chicago river, was assembled as a shipping and industrial
hub 135 years ago, just prior to the Civil War. (Abraham
Lincoln was one of the attorneys who helped structure the
original land trust.) Today the site is remarkably well
located in the city, bound on the west by the "Magnificent
Mile," North Michigan Avenue, and on the east by Lake Shore
Drive.16
Revamped in 1962 as an equity-oriented REIT, the
closely held Chicago Dock did not move into the public
investment arena until the mid-1980s when it tendered a
200-for-1 stock split to lower its share price and
encourage more public trading. Shortly thereafter, the
company announced plans to develop the old shipping pier
area as part of Cityfront Center, a 60-acre, 12.5 million
square foot mixed-use project to be fashioned after New
York's Battery Park City. In a short-lived venture
partnership with Equitable Life Assurance Society, the
trust was primarily responsible for obtaining necessary
masterplan and design approvals to redevelop the land and
infrastructure. Chicago Dock and Equitable amicably
divided the tract in 1986 and have developed their
respective parcels independently but under the same master
plan. Chicago Dock has used ground leases, fee sales, and
joint venture partnerships with developers to create
apartments, hotels, public open spaces and office space.
Development of the tract is still underway. In addition,
the trust has also acquired properties in Denver,
Indianapolis, Tampa and Lansing, Michigan.
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CHAPTER THREE
EVALUATING THE REIT AS A VEHICLE FOR DEVELOPMENT
"We were masters of poor timing. We are not
recovering because we never had the opportunity
to get started."
Arthur Viner, Chairman,
ICM Property Investors
(June 22, 1990)
Generally speaking, the Acquisition & Redevelopment
REITs have performed more successfully over the last five
years than those in the Joint Venture group. To warrant
such a statement we must define the criteria by which to
evaluate a value-creation REIT's success. There are four
basic areas in which these REITs can demonstrate
performance. These four areas can be thought of as steps
in a cycle that a REIT must complete in order to succeed,
as a real estate security, and grow. The steps are (1) the
ability to raise capital; (2) the ability to put that
capital to productive use, that is, to develop in line with
its investment strategy; (3) the ability to generate cash
flow, or to manage the properties; and (4) the ability to
enhance shareholders' returns, or to maintain attractive
performance as a security. Completing the fourth step
enables the REIT to begin again at step one and raise more
capital. Successful completion of each step in the cycle
is dependent- on completion of the previous step, and an
equity REIT will grow in asset base and share value each
time the cycle is completed. Perhaps the most crucial run
through the cycle is the initial one. Since their
inception in the mid-1980s, none of the Joint Venture REITs
have successfully completed their first full cycle. This
chapter, with empirical data tracing the steps of the
cycle, seeks to explain the plight of the Joint Venture
REITs and, in contrast, the stronger performance of the
Acquisition & Redevelopment group.
Some of the reasons for the difficulties faced by the
Joint Venture group are not linked to their choice of the
REIT vehicle. Specifically, the nationwide downturn in the
commercial real estate market fell at a most inopportune
time for these fledgling REITs. Given the real estate
market's volatility in the last five years, it would be
unwise to conclude that the use of the REIT for this
particular development strategy is ineffective. Market
conditions have caused many of the problems.
The overbuilt condition of U.S. real estate markets
has not changed dramatically over the past two to three
years. Commercial real estate vacancy rates remain at
distressingly high levels for most regions of the country.
Due to reductions in new construction, areas with the
highest vacancy rates have improved slightly, but real
turnarounds have yet to occur. Even in those areas with
expanding economies, development activity is still low
because the supply of commercial real estate continues to
outpace absorption of vacant space. The impact of these
high vacancy rates has flattened or depressed effective
rental rates as owners have competed aggressively for
tenants. High vacancy rates have also placed a premium on
property which is significantly leased versus development
projects. Even if new leasing efforts are successful,
cash flow may be delayed due to expensive rent concessions,
including free rent, now common in the marketplace.
The Joint Venture REITs all started operations at the
crest of a wave of real estate development, and they have
been operating in the declining market ever since.
Compared to the Joint Venture group, the Acquisition &
Redevelopment REITs entered the present soft market with
established portfolios, some of which include debt-free
projects. With operating histories spanning 25 years or
more, both Federal Realty and New Plan have survived major
recessions, first in 1974-75 when many real estate markets
were overbuilt, and second in 1981-82 when markets were
tighter, aggregate construction volume was heavy, and user
demand was strong. This resilience could be attributable
to the nature of the investment portfolios. The
Acquisition & Redevelopment typically invest in low glamor,
high utility retail shopping centers and apartments. The
demand for consumer necessities and affordable rental
housing remain generally constant, even during recessionary
periods. Commercial office space, on the other hand, is
more like a commodity. That is to say that, during periods
of economic hardship, firms can contract by reducing staff
or reducing office space per worker and thus cut down their
consumption of space. As a matter of timing, many of the
difficulties faced by the Joint Venture REITs can be
attributed to their recent start-up followed soon after by
depressed conditions in real estate markets.
Contrasting Track Records: Performance as a Security
Security returns, the last step listed in the cycle of
REIT growth and success, are generally the first
performance indicator the shareholder sees. Dividend
yields and share prices are easily monitored in the
newspaper, on a daily basis. The internal activities of
the REIT that ultimately determine its security
performance, however, are tougher to observe. Poor
performance over time is a likely tip-off that the REIT in
question has stumbled at some previous point in the cycle,
as is the case with the Joint Venture group of REITs.
Evaluation of security performance shown in Exhibit 3.1
indicates that over time the Joint Venture group have cut
dividends; in turn, share prices have fallen and returns
have been flat.
Another potential measure of a REIT's security
performance is the value of each share relative to the
proportionate fair market value of the underlying real
estate. This information is more difficult obtain since
the appraised value of the properties is published only at
the REIT's discretion. Real estate securities generally
trade at a discounted value from that of their real estate.
This is not always the case, however. REITs that have
demonstrated- a particularly successful management track
record and a history of attractive shareholder returns don
trade at a premium. Based on their own appraisals, the
market value of outstanding shares of New Plan Realty
Trust, for example, was greater than the current value of
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EXHIBIT 3.1 : ANNUAL SHAREHOLDER RETURNS OF VALUE-CREATION REITS
JOINT VENTURE REITS 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Copley Properties, Inc.
Share Price $20.00 IPO, $17.25 $18.38 $16.75 $17.00 $12.00
Distributions Paid July 29, 1985 $0.69 $1.65 $1.68 $1.68 $1.50
Annual Return -10% 16% 0% 12% -21%
ICM Property Investors
Share Price $20.00 IPO, $14.81 $14.38 $11.00 $9.44 $7.63
Distributions Paid Jan. 25, 1985 $1.21 $1.39 $1.48 $1.36 $0.70
Annual Return 
-20% 6% -13% -2% -12%
MSA Realty Corporation
Share Price $9.00 IPO, $9.00 $8.63 $10.81 $8.56 $8.38 $8.75
Distributions Paid Apr. 5, 1984 $0.48 $0.84 $0.95 $1.00 $1.00 $0.60
Annual Return 5% 5% 36% -12% 9% 12%
ACQUISITION &
REDEVELOPMENT REITS 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Federal Realty Trust
Share Price $6.88 $8.50 $10.38 $12.50 $15.25 $17.13 $18.38 $21.00 $22.25 $24.00
Distributions Paid $0.53 $0.59 $0.68 $0.75 $0.89 $0.98 $1.05 $1.11 $1.23 $1.36
Annual Return 18% 32% 30% 28% 29% 19% 13% 20% 12% 14%
IRT Property Company
Share Price na $5.40 $6.37 $8.32 $9.52 $10.15 $13.50 $12.55 $14.50 $13.19
Distributions Paid $0.41 $0.53 $0.63 $0.68 $0.75 $0.90 $1.16 $1.04 $1.10 $1.15
Annual Return na na 30% 41% 23% 16% 44% 1% 24% -1%
New Plan Realty Trust
Share Price $3.71 $3.92 $5.09 $8.00 $8.50 $11.50 $13.75 $17.25 $14.75 $17.50
Distributions Paid $0.30 $0.34 $0.39 $0.51 $0.57 $0.65 $0.73 $0.81 $0.89 $1.02
Annual Return 23% 15% 40% 67% 13% 43% 26% 31% -9% 26%
Source: Annual reports and 10-Ks.
NOTES:
Share Price = Avg. 4th Quarter Closing Price
Distributions Paid = Total annual dividends for calender year.
(Change in share price from previous year + Distributions)
Annual Return = ----------------------------------------------------------
Previous year's share price
Prices and distributions have been adjusted to reflect stock splits where necessary.
Initial year of operations are calculated assuming purchase at IPO and sale at 4th quarter.
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the real estate in 1987 and 1989. In contrast, Copley
properties trades at a significantly discounted market
price, as shown in Exhibit 3.2.
Appraisal data is not available for each of the
case-study REITs, but each of the Joint Venture REITs
acknowledges that the asset value of its cumulative stock
is substantially discounted from the value of its real
estate holdings. For an equity REIT to enjoy the
competitive advantage of "overvalued" stock they must
demonstrate a long history of increasing returns. New Plan
Realty Trust is one of the few companies that has been able
to push the market value of their stock beyond the net
worth of the underlying real estate. This fortunate
situation is found only among the older REITs which have
demonstrated steady performance. Youth and perceived
inexperience have been a disadvantage to the Joint Venture
group of REITs (even though each of the sponsors themselves
had considerable prior real estate expertise). Indeed,
securities performance of the Joint Venture REITs have
clearly lagged that of the Acquisition & Redevelopment
group. The root of the valuation problem is poor income
performance of the property. However, securitization (and
the behavior of the market) compounds the problem for the
lagging Joint Venture REITs by driving prices below the
value of their property. Whereas, the market actually
augments the value of older workhorse REITs like New Plan.
Hence, the "leverage" of going public with the REIT
vehiclecan be positive or negative. The remainder of the
EXHIBIT 3.2
SECURITIES MARKET PRICE vs. APPRAISED REAL ESTATE VALUE
(Dollars per Share) 1989 1988 1987
Copley Properties Inc.
Market value: $12.00 $17.00 $16.75
Appraised value: $22.44 $23.37 $23.37
Premium (Discount): -46.5% -27.3% -28.3%
New Plan Realty Trust
Market value: $17.50 $14.75 $18.10
Appraised value: $16.67 $16.27 $17.25
Premium (Discount): 5.0% -9.3% 4.9%
Source: 1987 - 1989 annual reports of each company.
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chapter will examine the other steps of the cycle to
explore the reasons behind these differences in
performance.
Building the Bricks and Mortar:
Performance as Developers
Despite their poor performance as securities, the
Joint Venture REITs did manage to develop real estate-- as
they had originally set out to do. In fact, their success
as prolific developers has since proven to be a detriment.
All of the Joint Venture development REITs have faced
difficulties leasing their newly completed space under weak
market conditions. There are also key differences between
development strategies of the two case study groups that
explain the Joint Venture REITs' glut of unleased space.
For one thing, the Joint Venture REITs relied primarily
upon development property to be the foundation of their
portfolios, while the Acquisition & Redevelopment group
used development and renovation, in moderation, to add to
an existing foundation of income properties. In short, the
Joint Venture group developed too much too fast.
Third party participation in the development process
is another factor. The Acquisition & Redevelopment
essentially raise 100% of the capital, debt and/or equity,
for a given development project and complete it for their
own portfolio as 100% owners. In contrast, the Joint
Venture REITs have been criticized for funding sometimes up
to 100% of the development capital, through either
construction loans, mortgages or equity contributions, in
exchange for 50% to 60% equity partnership positions with
the developer. 19  Nonperformance by the outside
developer/partner represents an additional layer of risk
faced by the Joint Venture REITs.
To highlight the two different approaches to
value-creation, consider two shopping center REITs-- MSA
Realty and Federal Realty. MSA began operations in 1984
with seven joint venture partnerships. By the end of 1989
the company opened 17 shopping centers with one still under
development. Yet total assets on the balance sheet
decreased from $98 million in 1984 down to $97 million at
the end of 1989; some partnerships were sold and others
lost value. (The capital structure of these REITs over is
presented later in the chapter in Exhibit 3.8) In that same
time period Federal Realty renovated only seven shopping
centers of 23 acquired; assets increased four-fold from
$133 million to $564 million. In terms of aggregate
rentable area completed, MSA outperformed Federal Realty as
a retail developer. The problems for MSA began after the
joint ventures progressed from the construction phase
(during which the company received guaranteed returns from
the developer) to the early operational phase during which
the centers were not fully leased.
MSA's structure and higher development volume brought
another added cost not faced by the Acquisition &
Redevelopment REITs-- development fees. The development
partners used by MSA and some other Joint Venture REITs
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typically charge fees at the completion of the projects,
above and beyond whatever equity returns they receive as
joint venture partners. In the case of ICM Property
Investors and Copley Properties, REIT management is
motivated to negotiate a lower fee structure for their
various independent developer/partners. This may or may
not be true in the case of MSA Realty because one third of
its board is staffed by officers of the developer, the only
developer, receiving those fees. Similarly, property
management is provided on a fee basis by another affiliate
of Melvin Simon & Associates. If development is
fee-driven, it is a potential abuse of shareholders'
interests.
Exhibit 3.3 illustrates the higher risk exposure faced
by the ambitious Joint Venture REITs. In their start-up
years these companies operated with over half their
portfolios under development. Deals were generally
structured so the REIT would receive guaranteed returns
during the construction and prescribed lease-up period.
For an office building this could last from 24 to 36
months, depending upon how early the REIT committed to the
project. As a result, initially the REITs were somewhat
insulated from the effects of the softening market. In
most cases, joint ventures generated lower cash flows after
transition from the subsidized-return periods. The
Acquisition & Redevelopment REITs, on the other hand, could
complete a major renovation within the course of 8 to 24
months. In some cases work could be phased so that a
EXHIBIT 3.3
DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ACTIVITY
JOINT VENTURE REITS 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
COPLEY PROPERTIES, INC. (c)(d)
Total Properties: 6 10 13 12 12
Under Development: 5 7 10 6 6
Total Square Footage: 2,012,000 2,981,000 4,201,000 4,235,000 4,068,000
Under Development: 1,171,000 1,914,000 2,887,000 1,931,000 1,474,000
Pct. Under Development: 58% 64% 69% 46% 36%
ICM PROPERTY INVESTORS (c)
Total Properties: 7 10 10 11 11
Under Development: 4 5 0 1 0
Total Square Footage: 784,199 1,318,635 1,318,635 1,392,635 1,392,635
Under Development: 453,700 630,436 0 74,000 0
Pct. Under Development: 58% 48% 0% 5% 0%
MSA REALTY
Total Properties: 7 12 13 18 15
Under Development: 5 7 4 6 4
Total Square Footage: 2,427,000 3,714,000 3,979,000 5,767,000 4,767,000
Under Development: 1,257,000 2,441,000 753,000 1,007,000 435,000
Pct. Under Development: 52% 66% 19% 17% 9%
SOURCE: Based on information and narrative accounts of development
activity as presented in the annual reports and 10-Ks for
each company.
NOTES:(c) Properties may consist of multiple buildings or office parks.
(d) Property under development also includes planned projects;
and those completed, but still in budgeted lease-up period.
EXHIBIT 3.3
DEVELOPMENT AND RENOVATION ACTIVITY (continued)
ACQUISITION &
REDEVELOPMENT REITS 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
FEDERAL REALTY TRUST (a)
Total Properties: 26 31 34 41 42
Under Development: 5 2 3 3 3
Total Square Footage: 5,650,000 6,895,000 7,246,000 8,620,000 8,936,000
Under Development: 1,442,000 812,000 974,000 778,000 749,000
Pct. Under Development: 26% 12% 13% 9% 8%
IRT PROPERTY COMPANY (b)
Total Properties: 31 55 66 68 68
Under Development: 3 3 0 1 3
Total Square Footage: 3,112,261 4,484,000 5,700,500 5,692,000 5,418,000
Under Development: 388,753 405,000 0 480,120 161,284
Pct. Under Development: 12% 9% 0% 8% 3%
NEW PLAN REALTY
Total Properties: 35 39 46
Under Development: 6 6 4
(Data not available)
Total Square Footage: 4,500,000 5,272,000 6,250,000
Under Development: 94,200 692,300 638,000
Pct. Under Development: 2% 13% 10%
SOURCE: Based on information and narrative accounts of development
activity as presented in the annual reports and 10-Ks for
each company.
NOTES:(a) Includes retail portfolio only.
(b) Includes non-residential, equity investments only.
shopping center was still producing rent during
construction. These different approaches in development
account for the differences in cash flows described below.
Management Ability:
Performance Measured Through Cash Flow
Management of a REIT is a significantly more complex
task than that of, say, a stock and bond portfolio. Real
property is a tangible investment that requires active
day-to-day management. This property management includes
construction, leasing, repair and maintenance of quality
and appearance. Whether handled in-house or through
independent contractors, a REIT's ultimate responsibility
is to monitor and manage these activities. As portfolio
asset managers, REIT executives must also determine when
and how much capital should be allocated to investment and
development, and to which properties. All actions and
decisions imposed upon the REIT, from initial business
strategy to building maintenance, constitute management.
Perhaps a true measure of management ability would
include a qualitative, and largely subjective, evaluation.
For our purposes, however, we will use cash flow as a
benchmark to compare managements and then discuss what
factors might account for the differences. One could argue
that the securities market takes a similar "bottom-line"
approach and recognizes good management by the cash flow
extracted from the real estate. Dividends are generally a
consistent proxy for cash flow; a REIT distributes most of
its cash, but dividends only reflect cash flowing out, not
the sources. A REIT, for example, could take out a loan to
cover dividend payments during temporary periods of high
vacancy. The original source of a REIT's cash flow for any
given year is also important information in understanding
performance.
Defining Cash Flow: Sources and Uses
As REITs have been followed more widely, industry
analysts have tracked cash flow, rather than earnings, as a
more significant performance measure. "Earnings," or net
income, is an accounting term that typically includes
deductions of non-cash charges like depreciation, which
have no effect on cash flow. As a measure of performance,
earnings tend to understate a REIT's actual net rental
income, particularly when there are large depreciation
deductions. On the other hand, principal repayments of
loans are not deducted from earnings. Thus, the
conventional measure of stock performance,
earnings-per-share, has little relevance when applied to
real estate securities. For an equity REIT, the net
operating income from the real estate holdings or "cash
from operations" is a more significant measure of
performance. Typically, REIT annual reports devote a great
deal of verbiage to make this point to shareholders. The
numbers are harder to track, however.
After a long period of debate, the National
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) has
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yet to adopt a uniform definition of "cash from
operations." The definition varies among REITs, but is
generally defined as net income before gains on sales of
real estate less non-cash items such as depreciation and
mortgage amortization. Some REITs with particularly large
portfolios, New Plan Realty Trust among them, would argue
that gains on the sale of property are rightfully a
component of operating activities, not investing
activities, particularly if the REIT is large and routinely
sells property. This issue is controversial. Some members
of NAREIT feel that including gains from the sale of
property as operational income provides a distorted picture
of the business. For instance, a troubled REIT in the
process of liquidation would show a handsome income from
operations if such a measure included gains from sales.
Cash from operations, however, is not the only source
of cash flow to a REIT. Money can be obtained through
financing, either borrowings or equity placements.
Purchase or sale of property also affects REIT cash flows.
Following new regulations, REITs now provide a Statement of
Cash Flow in their reports to shareholders. These
statements group cash flows into three somewhat
standardized categories:
Operating Activities: Generally including all
rental income, property related expenses like
utilities, repairs and maintenance, real estate taxes
and property management. Funds to and from joint
ventures are also under this heading.
Investing Activities: Including investments in
real estate and other assets, net of debt assumed;
the purchase and sale of short-term investments;
proceeds from insurance claims and other such
investment cash flows.
Financing Activities: Including proceeds from
issuance of shares, cash distributions paid to
shareholders, borrowings and repayments, mortgage
principal payments, issuance costs, and other
financial cash flows.
Cash Flow Tells the Story
The tables in Exhibit 3.4 present information taken
from the Annual Report Statements of Cash Flows for the
case-study REITs. Exhibit 3.5, is a one-page summary with
dividend coverage ratios, (cash from operations divided by
dividends paid) presented for easier comparison of the
REITs. The cash flow record holds evidence that the
Acquisition & Redevelopment group have outperformed the
Joint Venture REITs on the basis of cash flow. Two
observations are particularly relevant. First, cash from
operations has been sporadic but generally declining among
the Joint Venture group, and thus accounts for their
declining dividends identified earlier. With the exception
of IRT (in 1989), all of the Acquisition & Redevelopment
REITs recorded steadily increasing cash from operationsover
the same period. Second, the level of cash from operations
of the Acquisition & Redevelopment REITs has largely
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EXHIBIT 3.4
CONDENSED ANNUAL CASH FLOW DATA
COPLEY PROPERTIES, INC.
(thousands) 1986 1987 1988 1989
Net Income (Loss): $5,438 $4,268 $3,771 $2,262
Adjustments to reconciLe net income
to net cash from operations: 1,083 2,945 3,149 3,333
Net Cash provided (used) ------- ------- ------- -------
By operating activities: 6,521 7,212 6,920 5,594
By investing activities: (410) (14,682) 1,551 9,578
By financing activities: 151 13,851 (1,334) (9,056)
(before paying dividends)
Distributions Paid: (6,619) (6,713) (6,733) (6,252)
Increase(Decrease) in Cash: ($356) ($331) $404 ($135)
ICM PROPERTY INVESTORS:
(thousands) 1986 1987 1988 1989
Net Income (Loss): $3,888 ($5,198) ($4,113) ($1,753)
Adjustments to reconciLe net income
to net cash from operations: (340) 8,019 2,925 4,293
Net Cash provided (used) ------- ------- ------- -------
By operating activities: 3,548 2,821 (1,188) 2,540
By investing activities: 4,040 (1,912) (149) (4,657)
By financing activities: 0 8,162 9,532 7,457
(before paying dividends)
Distributions Paid: (7,835) (8,642) (7,719) (5,039)
Increase (Decrease) in Cash: ($247) $429 $476 $301
Source: AnnuaL reports and 10-Ks.
EXHIBIT 3.4
CONDENSED ANNUAL CASH FLOW DATA (continued)
MSA REALTY TRUST
(thousands) 1986 1987 1988 1989
Net Income (Loss): $3,213 $4,990 $68 ($4,568)
Adjustments to reconcile net income
to net cash from operations: (2,198) (4,745) (2,864) 3,941
Net Cash provided (used) ------- ------- ------- -------
By operating activities: 1,016 245 (2,796) (627)
By investing activities: 6,145 (18,831) 30,887 21,677
By financing activities: 8,495 19,542 16,457 (10,354)
(before paying dividends)
Distributions Paid: (4,025) (8,511) (8,584) (5,183)
Increase (Decrease) in Cash: $11,631 ($7,555) $35,964 $5,513
FEDERAL REALTY INVESTMENT TRUST
(thousands) 1986 1987 1988 1989
Net Income (Loss): $14,916 $6,045 $9,274 $11,997
Adjustments to reconcile net income
to net cash from operations: (2,086) 12,285 9,187 7,462
Net Cash provided (used) ------- ------- ------- -------
By operating activities: 12,830 18,330 18,461 19,459
By investing activities: (102,643) (84,075) (6,813) (35,143)
By financing activities: 84,438 95,957 (69) 69,545
(before paying dividends)
Distributions Paid: (12,286) (14,260) (16,788) (19,174)
Increase (Decrease) in Cash: ($17,661) $15,952 ($5,209) $34,687
Source: Annual reports and 10-Ks.
EXHIBIT 3.4
CONDENSED ANNUAL CASH FLOW DATA (continued)
IRT PROPERTY COMPANY
(thousands) 1986 1987 1988 1989
Net Income (Loss): $10,055 $7,898 $15,117 $8,911
Adjustments to reconcile net income
to net cash from operations: 102 5,024 (826) 4,976
Net Cash provided (used) ------- ------- ------- -------
By operating activities: 10,157 12,922 14,292 13,887
By investing activities: (100,199) (2,849) (403) (13,400)
By financing activities: 80,890 24,403 3,698 2,452
(before paying dividends)
Distributions Paid: (11,856) (12,864) (13,283) (13,973)
Increase (Decrease) in Cash: ($21,008) $21,613 $4,303 ($11,033)
NEW PLAN REALTY TRUST
(thousands) 1986 1987 1988 1989
Net Income (Loss): $15,618 $17,966 $23,450 $27,111
Adjustments to reconcile net income
to net cash from operations: (114) 3,385 767 1,922
Net Cash provided (used) ------- ------- ------- -------
By operating activities: 15,505 21,351 24,217 29,032
By investing activities: (12,085) (18,938) (34,210) (40,637)
By financing activities: 34,787 (37,889) (48,698) 52,247
(before paying dividends)
Distributions Paid: (14,747) (18,257) (23,780) (28,148)
Increase (Decrease) in Cash: $23,460 ($53,734)($82,470) $12,495
Source: Annual reports and 10-Ks.
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EXHIBIT 3.5
CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS AND DIVIDEND COVERAGE RATIOS
JOINT VENTURE REITS
(thousands) 1986 1987 1988 1989
COPLEY PROPERTIES, INC.
Cash from operating activities: 6,521 7,212 6,920 5,594
Distributions Paid: $6,619 $6,713 $6,733 $6,252
Dividend Coverage Ratio: 99% 107% 103% 89%
ICM PROPERTY INVESTORS:
Cash from operating activities: 3,548 2,821 (1,188) 2,540
Distributions Paid: $7,835 $8,642 $7,719 $5,039
Dividend Coverage Ratio: 45% 33% -15% 50%
MSA REALTY TRUST
Cash from operating activities: 1,016 245 (2,796) (627)
Distributions Paid: $4,025 $8,511 $8,584 $5,183
Dividend Coverage Ratio: 25% 3% -33% -12%
ACQUISITION & REDEVELOPMENT REITS
(thousands) 1986 1987 1988 1989
FEDERAL REALTY INVESTMENT TRUST
Cash from operating activities: 12,830 18,330 18,461 19,459
Distributions Paid: $12,286 $14,260 $16,788 $19,174
Dividend Coverage Ratio: 104% 129% 110% 101%
IRT PROPERTY COMPANY
Cash from operating activities: 10,157 12,922 14,292 13,887
Distributions Paid: $11,856 $12,864 $13,283 $13,973
Dividend Coverage Ratio: 86% 100% 108% 99%
NEW PLAN-REALTY TRUST
Cash from operating activities: 15,505 21,351 24,217 29,032
Distributions Paid: $14,747 $18,257 $23,780 $28,148
Dividend Coverage Ratio: 105% 117% 102% 103%
Source: Exhibit 3.4
covered their dividends paid. Two of the Joint Venture
REITs, ICM Property Company and MSA Realty, have routinely
distributed amounts greater than their cash received from
operations. With a slightly cleaner bill of health, Copley
properties shows funds from operations that cover or exceed
distributions, although dividends have been reduced over
time.
For a closer evaluation of cash flow performance
compare the selected data for ICM Property Investors and
New Plan Realty in Exhibits 3.4 and 3.5. While the two
REITs are very different in their investment strategies and
portfolio holdings, the comparison demonstrates the
significance of cash flow sources. Dividend coverage
ratios in excess of 100% indicate that Federal Realty
consistently earns more than enough cash through real
estate operations to cover dividend payout. In the case of
ICM, however, cash flow from operations covered, at best,
half of the dividends paid. Most of their positive cash
flows did not come from the operating activities, i.e. real
estate. Rather 75% to 100% of the incoming cash flow came
through financing activities which, in this particular
case, were primarily bank loans. In short, it would appear
that ICM is using borrowed money to pay dividends. (New
Plan's whopping $108 million financing activity in 1989
reflects the proceeds of a public offering.)
Disparity of Cash Flow Performance: Reasons Why
Each of the Joint Venture REITs has had to reduce
their dividends as a result of poor cash flows from real
estate investments. As outlined earlier, leasing newly
developed projects has proven to be much more difficult
than expected. If this is a reflection on management, then
perhaps their most significant err was to start a REIT-- in
1985-- with no existing portfolio of income-producing
properties, thereby bringing product on line into an
overbuilt market. The choice of product types might also
account for the differing performance records. Office and
industrial projects, developed from empty land, take much
longer than the renovation of existing shopping centers.
Office and industrial properties have also been harder hit
by recent soft market conditions than retail and
residential holdings.
The number of projects under development at any one
time is another potential factor explaining the Joint
Venture REITs' reduced cash flows. Consider again, for
example, Federal Realty and MSA Realty. Both invested in
community shopping centers, but Federal demonstrated much
higher cash flows over the six-year life of MSA. One key
difference is the ratio of completed leased projects to
those under construction in the portfolio. Federal manages
a portfolio of 42 centers, some of which have been owned
and generating income for as far back as the 1960s. From
1984 to the present, at any given point in time, typically
one or two of those centers may be under substantial
redevelopment. MSA Realty's portfilio is quite different;
out of 18 total investment properties in 1988, eight
(almost half) were either under development or completed
within that year. By early 1990 almost all of the
remaining MSA holdings not under development were still in
the initial lease-up phase. The other Joint Venture REITs,
with their office and industrial holdings, all faced
equally severe market risks by having so much of their
portfolios subject to lease-up during what turned out to be
a depressed real estate market.
A Typical Joint Venture Tailspin
This actual example of an ICM deal illustrates the
combined effect of the pitfalls faced by the Joint Venture
REITs; an overbuilt market, developer/partner risk, and
unforeseen cash calls. Maitland Colonnades, a four story,
252,000 square foot Florida office building, was a typical
"equity-gap" partnership. In 1986, ICM contributed
$250,000 in exchange for a 5% general partnership in
position. The REIT agreed to fund up to $8.25 million, if
needed, to cover any gaps above the third-party
construction loan. As a partner, the REIT would receive an
11% preferred return on its equity (even during
construction and lease-up), 50% of net cash flows above the
preferred return, and 50% of any net proceeds from sale of
the property. If the $8.25 million was not enough the
developer was to commit up to $1.25 million. Then if the
project needed still more cash, the developer and ICM would
make equal contributions as required. That was the plan.
By the end of 1988, the REIT had funded its full $8.25
million commitment. The project had gradually reached 90%
occupancy, but concessions had substantially lowered
effective rents; the partnership needed additional cash
flow but the developer was unable to meet its commitment.
ICM assumed the developer's obligation in exchange for a
larger general partnership position. With each additional
contribution thereafter, ICM negotiated the dubious
privilege of greater and greater equity ownership. By the
end of 1989 ICM was a "47%" general partner entitled to
receive 91.75% of both the gain from sale and net cash
flows above the preferred return.
On March 31, 1990 the Maitland partnership's $26.75
million construction loan came due. Unable to obtain
permanent financing as of June 1990, ICM had been granted
an extension and was involved in a "workout" negotiation
with the construction lender. Terms could involve reducing
the loan amount by placing a mortgage on one of ICM's other
more stable properties. If an agreement cannot be reached,
ICM stands to lose its interest in the property.
Problematic low cash flows from real estate of the
Joint Venture REITs stemmed from a large proportion of
newly developed property in the portfolio, additional
funding to the joint ventures during lease-up, rent
concessions in the lagging market, and completion of
projects at a time of over supply in the market. The low
cash flows, in turn, prohibited subsequent attempts to
raise capital.
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Raising Capital: Availability and Affordability
"When we started in 1985, I would have guessed
that by 1990 we would have made three or four
trips back to the capital markets, doubled our
equity base, and trade at a share price of
between $20 and $30."
Steve Anthony, President of
Copley Properties, Inc.
(June 20, 1990)
Due to declining dividends and the lagging value of
their share prices, none of the Joint Venture REITs have
been able to return to the securities marketplace for
equity since their initial offerings. Some have added debt
to their capital structure, through short-term lines of
credit and refinancing of completed properties, but even
access to debt could have been more advantageous with the
benefit of stronger securities.
Over the last five years, consistent dividend records
and strong annual returns have enabled the Acquisition &
Redevelopment REITs to secure a variety of lower cost debt
instruments, convertible debentures, and subsequent public
equity offerings, as illustrated in Exhibit 3.6, which
presents a summary of capital market activities. In
addition to these major public and private offerings, each
of the Acquisition & Redevelopment REITs added equity by
issuing shares through automatic dividend reinvestment
plans available to shareholders. Some of these REITs have
also issued shares, rather than cash, to fund acquisitions.
Exhibit 3.7 graphically illustrates the changing
capital structures of the six case-study REITs over the
last 10 years. Through frequent access to the
EXHIBIT 3.6
CAPITAL MARKET ACTIVITY: ACQUISITION & REDEVELOPMENT REITS
12/31/84 through 12/31/89
Approximate
Year Net Proceeds Description
1989 $44,900,000 Commmon stock offering, 2 million
shares at $24 per share.
1987 $100,000,000 5.25% convertible subordinated
debentures. Issued to European
investors in Eurodollars, not
registered with the SEC.
1986 $49,000,000 8.65% Senior Notes
1985 $40,000,000 8.75% Convertible subordinated
debentures.
Total: $233,900,000
1987 $25,000,000 2% Convertible subordinated
debentures, Eurodollar bond issue.
(Actual cost of capital is estimated
to be 7.8% to 8% dependent on time of
redemption.)
1985 $19,127,000 Comnon stock offering, 1,305,000
shares at $15.75 per share.
Total: $44,127,000
1989 $110,000,000 Sold 6,315,000 new shares of common
stock in a public offering and
privately sold 1,100,000 shares to a
British pension fund.
1985 $66,700,000 8.375% convertible subordinated
debentures.
Total: $176,700,000
Source: Annual reports and 10-Ks.
Major debt and equity placements only:
Does not include shares issued through dividend reinvestment plans.
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capitalmarkets each of the Acquisition & Redevelopment
REITs has increased its asset base and diversified its
capital structure. During the last five years that brought
such a challenging market for the Joint Venture group, the
asset base for each of the three A&R REITs more than
doubled. The charts also indicate that the level of
shareholder's equity of the Joint Venture REITs has
actually declined in recent years. This is a significant
point since the dollar amount, not number of shares, has
decreased. After paying dividends and additional capital
infusions to joint ventures, these REITs have shown
cumulative annual deficits which have depleted the level of
equity. obviously, if this trend were to continue, the
shares could eventually become worthless in terms of book
value.
Debt Off of the Balance Sheet
REITs that participate in joint venture partnerships
may not reveal all of the debt used on individual
properties. This is an important point to recognize when
comparing the capital structure (as in Exhibit 3.7)
employed by various companies. Debt can be incurred by the
joint venture partnership, rather than the REIT itself. Of
course, in some cases the REIT is the lender. The 1989
annual report data published by Copley Properties, for
example, would indicate that the REIT is capitalized with
almost all equity. Interviews with management revealed
that the properties are also encumbered by debt incurred at
Copley Properties, Inca.
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the joint venture partnership level. In Copley's case, the
outside debt was about $84 million in June of 1989. The
point to remember is that corporate debt on the balance
sheet does not nessecarily reflect the debt on the actual
properties, especially in the case of the Joint Venture
group of REITs. The disparity between debt on and off the
balance sheet can distort a comparison of REIT capital
structures. Since higher leverage equates to higher risk,
the desire to conceal additional debt could be driven by a
desire maintain a lower perception of leverage and thus
preserve existing market value of the security.
The Struggling Class of '85: Strategies for the Future
New Directions for Copley Properties, Inc.
The symptoms clearly indicate Copley has been hit by
the poor real estate market-- reduced cash flows, reduced
dividend payments and a share price that trades much lower
than the appraised value of real estate per share. During
the development and lease-up phases of projects, the
company received a significant portion of its cash from
guaranteed returns. As the agreements expired the company
had to rely on actual rental revenues generated by the
properties. Rent concessions and higher than expected
vacancy rates significantly reduced the rental income from
earlier proforma projections. Management's 1989 report to
shareholders attributes the decline in reported cash from
operations to this transition.
In response management has taken several steps to
reposition the company. First, in an effort to shore up
cash flow, the company has imposed an operating expense cap
of $650,000. Expenses above and beyond the cap will be
offset with a reduction in the advisor's management fee.
One expense to be eliminated is the annual appraisal of the
properties; few equity REITs provide this information on a
regular annual basis. Second, Copley Properties is
actively repurchasing its own shares, up to 500,000 shares
or 12.5% of its stock. The stated reason for the
repurchase is that, because the market price is so far
below the appraised value, management believes this to be
an effective use of resources that will benefit the
shareholders. Third, Copley plans to make strategic sales
of portfolio holdings, particularly any land holdings which
have a long developmental time frame.
Aside from the operational changes, Copley has
indicated that the REIT will move away from the original
development strategy. In the short run, gains from
property sales will be used to purchase assets that will
generate more current income, i.e. completed and leased
buildings. As in the past, the investment strategy of the
REIT mirrors the investment strategy that the advisor
employs with its institutional accounts. In the years to
come, Copley intends to avoid pure multi-phased development
projects of the past and concentrate instead on property
investments which are partially complete or require
relatively short-term renovation, rehabilitation or
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development. Whether this change is a commentary on the
original strategy or just a response to current market
forces, it would appear that by focusing on renovation
opportunities Copley is moving closer toward the methods
employed by the Acquisition & Redevelopment group of REITs.
MSA Realty Liquidation
MSA, like most other public companies, markets itself
to shareholders with glossy, well-designed, full-color
annual reports. At the risk of judging a book by its
cover, the 1989 annual report signaled that MSA was
suffering cash flow problems-- before opening to the first
page. In an effort to reduce printing costs, the latest
report is simply a copy of the 10-K and a cover letter,
bound simply in a white paper cover. The text inside
confirms that cash flow is indeed a problem and that MSA's
solution to the tough market is to liquidate. The company
has retained Morgan Stanley Realty Incorporated to seek out
potential purchasers. Liquidation of securitized assets
can be difficult, particularly if the assets are under
development or not fully leased. The REIT format also
poses problems for selling out. Liquidation of a REIT is a
viable strategy on an all-or-nothing basis only. If a
company sells assets slowly, on a property-by-property
basis, then it is at risk of losing REIT status due to
excessive income from gains on sales. MSA, for example,
sold its interests in four joint ventures to a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the advisor, Melvin Simon & Associates. If,
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however, MSA cannot sell substantially all the rest of its
assets by year end, then it has retained the right to buy
the four joint ventures right back again.
The Expansion of ICM Property Investors
As we saw earlier, cash flow from operations is also a
problem for ICM. One of the apparent disadvantages shared
by all of the Joint Venture REITs is the lack of an
existing portfolio. ICM Property Investors' solution is to
go out and get one. In a unique transaction, still under
negotiation at the time of this writing, ICM is seeking to
raise cash flow levels through the purchase of several
existing industrial properties from California developer
Peter B. Bedford. Instead of a cash price, Bedford will
receive 1,000,000 newly issued shares of ICM stock, plus
notes secured by purchase-money mortgages on the properties
acquired. Bedford has offered ICM its choice of a
portfolio of thirty industrial properties throughout the
United States. ICM expects to acquire about 15 properties
from the list of 30, with "an aggregate value that could
reach $30 million or more." ICM is currently inspecting
Bedford's properties to select which ones will be included
in the transaction. Bedford is presently assessing values
of the properties to establish "asking prices." In a
separate transaction Bedford has also purchased all
outstanding stock of Investors Central Management
Corporation, ICM's privately owned investment manager.
Given the low stock price, ICM was unable to raise
capital economically through conventional means. ICM
management describes the Bedford transaction as a private
means of financing portfolio expansion. Strategically, the
purchase also represents a shift away from the from the
original development investment plan. The stated goals of
the transaction are to diversify the investment portfolio,
increase total assets and cash flow, and to narrow the
present gap between cash flow from operations and
distributions.20
This transaction, and its final impact to the other
shareholders, raises some interesting questions. While it
is true that the added leased properties in the portfolio
will increase cash flows from rents, the issuance of one
million new shares requires that the new income be
distributed over that many more shares. Also, purchase
money mortgages, which are effectively seller-financing,
will require debt service payments that will also reduce
net cash flow. Only the final outcome of the deal will
will determine the impact on dividends and share value.
The transaction itself, however, underscores the
versatility of the REIT vehicle. If ICM management
accomplishes what they have described to shareholders, they
will have found a way to finance a $30-million purchase
through a REIT that has only declined in value out over its
five-year life.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS
A real estate investment trust is a simply a creature
of the Internal Revenue Code and securities law. "REIT"
alone does not describe a business. Any particular REIT
must be evaluated first, as a real estate company based on
its own individual strategies and practices. Second, one
must consider how well that particular company can achieve
its goals within the confines of the REIT legislative and
regulatory structure. Finally, as a publicly traded
security, a REITs' operational and financial strategy can be
hindered, or helped, by the external condition of the stock
market.
The Acquisition & Redevelopment REITs have successfully
used development and renovation to add value to their
portfolios. They were able to this, in moderation,
primarily because their broad portfolios of existing
properties generated income that enabled them to cover the
front-end negative cash flows of the development effort and
to continue paying out dividends, and even increase them,
without interruption. Renovation and development have been
employed successfully as one component of management's
overall strategy. The REIT vehicle has afforded these A & R
REITs a means to raise capital in a variety of ways and
thereby continually increase their asset base. Each of them
have increased the volume and diversity of their individual
capital structures over the past five years. The primary
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objective of these companies has been to amass portfolios of
attractive income properties and manage them effectively to
maximize profits. Recent expansive interpretation of the
tax code has permitted freedom to pursue these goals more
independently and aggressively. Given the current real
estate market environment, strategies that focus on finding
undervalued assets, redevelopment and diligent property
management seem to make more sense than development from the
ground up.
Poor securities performance is one indicator that the
Joint Venture REITs face problems today stemming from low
cash flow from their real estate investments. These
companies' investments were not diversified between new
development and existing income properties. After lengthy
development and construction periods, their first completed
projects entered the lease-up phase during an unforeseen
tough real estate markets marked by oversupply and free-rent
concessions. Without other leased properties to offset the
losses, these REITs were left no choice but to throw
additional capital at the anemic joint ventures and to
reduce distributions to equity shareholders. For this
group, the REIT vehicle has served as a means to raise
equity capital one time only-- at the initial public
offering. Debt capital has been added through permanent
mortgage refinancing of completed properties and short-term
lines of credit. These REITs are not likely to grow
substantially without new equity to balance out the debt.
Memories of 1974 and the downside risks of highly leveraged
REITs still haunt industry followers and investors. And as
a result, the Class of '85 is not likely to raise additional
public equity without improving the performance of their
securities.
Since public perception of the real estate market
influences the demand for REIT stock ownership, the Joint
Venture companies have been especially hard hit on two
fronts by the soft market. Joe O'Connor, chairman of Copley
Realty Advisors, recently claimed that, "The real estate
market is just getting bad enough to where I feel good about
it again." His point is that, if the current market
conditions are cyclical, then down times can bring bargain
investment opportunities. To a real estate professional
this concept makes perfect sense. But generally, stock
market investors look to previous performance records to
foreshadow future trends. It takes positive past
performance to fill the bandwagon with new investors. REIT
stocks are not gaining popularity as an investment. For the
twelve months preceding May 1990, the NAREIT share price
index, for Equity and Hybrid REITs, fell 10% and 35%
respectively. Over the same time period aggregate twelve
month total returns were -2.36% for Equity REITs and -21.69%
for Hybrids.21  REIT managers who identify attractive
investment opportunities now, at what might be the valley of
a real estate market cycle, will have a difficult task
raising public interest for investment. Furthermore,
current yields will be prohibitive for raising capital.
To summarize, any development business, including a
REIT, is susceptible to real estate market risks. Publicly
traded REITs depend on cash flow to prosper. Interruption
in cash flow due to risk exposure in real estate markets can
have detrimental effects on the security's stability and
thus the REIT. The plight of the class of '85 Joint Venture
REITs illustrates this, but alternate external conditions
could conceivably shake up the Acquisition & Redevelopment
REITs as well. If, for example, oversupply or some other
factor caused a drastic change in the demand for retail
space in community shopping centers then the REITs
concentrated in that area would face similar problems. IRT
Property Company, for example, attributes lower cash flows
in 1989 to an externality; the bankruptcy of one of their
anchor tenant chains, Revco Drugs. But the Acquisition &
Redevelopment REITs have a distinct advantage that comes
with age. Start-up for the Joint Venture development REITs
further compounded their exposure to market risks since all
of the initial portfolios consisted of unproven properties.
The REIT vehicle can facilitate development, that much
is clear. But real estate development, alone, will not
facilitate the income requirements of public ownership. For
REITs to be effective development machines, they need steady
reliable cash flow sources in the portfolio. Otherwise,
they cannot survive in the highly cyclical real estate
markets.
Current Trends and New Applications of the REIT
In their relatively short history, the definitive
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chapter on REITs as developers is still being written. All
of the discussion and analysis thus far have centered on
publicly traded REITs. Many of the problems already covered
are due to complexities and costs associated with the
unforgiving public securities market. There is, however,
another way that a REIT vehicle can facilitate real estate
development and circumvent the problems of entry barriers,
share volatility, high public offering costs and high
operating costs-- through the use of a private REIT. The
use of private REITs, as a start-up technique, may allow for
a new REIT to weather some initial cash flow shortages
without forever tarnishing its track record in the public
market.
Private REITs
It is important to note that the private REIT vehicle
is chosen primarily to enable its investors to circumvent an
onerous tax statute, not to access public capital. The key
investors in most private REITs are already flush with
capital. Typically such investors are large nonprofit
institutions like pension plans, endowments, and
foundations; not small individual shareholders.
The Internal Revenue Code restricts the use of borrowed
money by tax-exempt institutions. Although detailed and
complex restrictions vary by the type of institution, in
short, some tax-exempts are prohibited from investing in
"debt financed property" as defined by the Code. Virtually
all real estate investments, especially development
projects, are debt financed. Judicious use of leverage is,
by and large, a desirable way to enhance real estate
returns, even for risk-averse institutions. The REIT
structure serves as a conduit through which tax-exempt
institutions can benefit from the use of leverage without
technically investing in debt-financed property.
In simple terms the deals are set up in the following
way: The private REIT and a developer establish a joint
venture partnership, a separate business entity with just
two partners. The REIT provides the equity capital and the
developer provides the skill and expertise. This
partnership, not the REIT, is the entity that incurs debt
and develops the real estate projects. The investors in the
REIT, tax-exempt nonprofits, are thus insulated from the
debt financed property, which is held by the joint venture.
Such private trusts are set up as corporations that qualify
for REIT status under the Internal Revenue Code, but kept
intentionally small enough, less than 500 shareholders, to
avoid costly filing procedures with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Property Capital Advisors, Inc. (PCA) of Boston is the
advisory firm that handles Property Capital Trust, a public
equity REIT that trades on the American Stock Exchange.
While Property Capital Trust has participated for years in
development projects as a joint venture partner and
permanent lender, its advisor (PCA) also operates two
separate private REITs, PCA/Sammis and PCA/Tishman Speyer.
Each of the two REITs are reportedly capitalized with
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approximately $120 million in equity. (These are private
companies and specific financial information is not
available.) The PCA/Sammis REIT holds around twenty five
properties while the PCA/Tishman-Speyer REIT holds only
three. The two PCA private REITs each have about twenty
institutional investors who provide the necessary working
capital, although the required minimum number of
shareholders to form a REIT is one hundred. In some cases
minimal shareholdings must be sold to individuals in order
to meet the minimum requirement. Pension plans count as one
single individual shareholder whereas nonprofit corporations
can count each of their shareholders as individual
shareholders in the REIT. Large pension plan participants
can create complications since private REITs must also meet
the test that no more than 50% of the shares can be owned by
five or fewer individuals.
According to Robert Melzer, President of PCA, even
private REITs face some of the familiar complications of
adhering to the cumbersome REIT regulations. Excess cash,
which can be substantial at times, is a problem because it
must be put into real estate related investments. The
four-year minimum holding period inhibits the timely sale of
certain property. Because REITs are forbidden from
profiting from certain operational income, like tenant
improvement services, the REIT must forfeit some of the
income to the developer or negotiate additional compensation
through some other acceptible activity.
The private approach holds interesting prospects for
new development REITs, which are perceived as particularly
high-risk investments and substantially discounted on the
common market. As previously mentioned, entrepreneurs and
developers often identify investment opportunities at the
"bottom" of a market cycle, when the mainstream
securities-buying public is least likely to invest. It is
conceivable that the private vehicles could be used as
"incubators," designed specifically not to trade in a major
public market until after they have an opportunity to
develop a track record. Access to capital during the
incubation period would be augmented through joint venture
partnerships and private placements with institutional money
sources. After demonstrating success with institutional
funds the REIT could reasonably "go public" to tap
additional sources of capital. 22
REIT/REMIC Strategies
Another suggested development framework that may be a
viable of choice in the 1990s is a combination REIT/REMIC
vehicle. The real estate mortgage investment conduit
(REMIC) was created under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to
become the standard form of trading real estate
mortgage-backed securities. Combining a REIT with a REMIC
is a complex arrangement, but it fully exploits the current
legislation to overcome some of the start-up problems faced
by development REITs. It also provides the REIT a means to
additional capital through access to the secondary mortgage
market. To illustrate, Weirick's hypothetical example23
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outlined below weaves together several parameters that might
characterize publicly funded development projects of the
1990s; a renovation of an old warehouse building near
downtown, a build-to-suit finish out requirement for a
long-term tenant, and a public/private partnership
arrangement with the city to encourage further redevelopment
of the warehouse area.
Assume that the owner of the property has identified a
potential tenant interested in occupying the warehouse,
provided it could be redeveloped to a high quality standard.
The first step is the property owner, together with several
other private investors, forms an S corporation to supply
the initial investment capital. This set-up lets the
investors capture losses and any rehabilitation tax credits.
The S corporation, the tenant, and the city enter into a
development agreement. The tenant signs a lease, partially
guaranteed by the city (if required), so that additional
financing can be obtained from local institutions.
Development proceeds. Meanwhile, the city and the S
corporation work together with master planning architects to
design a development scheme for the surrounding area.
Sometime after the first property is completed and
demonstrates acceptable cash flow, the city initiates the
formation of a REIT. The REIT sells shares to raise capital
to buy the warehouse from the Subchapter S corporation and
to engage in further development of the area. The city's
REIT is set up so that it can also be a REMIC. A property
owner can transfer property at fair market value to a REMIC
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in return for a stream of future payments without being
subject to capital gains upon the swap. Thus, the S
corporation can swap its warehouse for an interest in the
REMIC to realize an income flow rather than a lump sum. The
income to the owner would be principal and interest payments
based on fair market value of the property and it would be
classified as portfolio income for tax purposes. A REMIC
can issue multiple classes of investor interests
(securities) backed by a pool of mortgages. Sale of REMIC
shares based on the mortgage allows financing to be
customized with offerings in the mortgage securities
secondary market. Mortgaging of the property will free up
the investor capital to pursue additional projects.
Now that the REIT has been established, the city can
use it to undertake infrastructure improvements in the area.
New renovation projects can also be developed, in a variety
of ways. One way is for the city's REIT to identify a
seller, obtain a long-term tenant commitment and purchase
the next old warehouse. The lease could be structured so
that the tenant could serve as independent contractor to be
the legal developer of its own new facility. Lease payments
could be adjusted (lower) during the development period to
allow for constructions expenditure. Through REMIC status,
the REIT can convert its assets into mortgage-backed
securities, providing even more efficient access to the
capital markets.
This suggested public use of the REIT is an untested
strategy that would require thorough research and legal
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review before it could actually be implemented. It is
included, however, to demonstrate that creative thinking may
lead to new and innovative uses of the REIT vehicle.
Final Note-
Further development of this country is likely to taper
in the years to come. More emphasis will be placed on
attentive asset management and renovation of underutilized
existing structures. The representative Acquisition &
Development REITs have demonstrated that these activities
can be capably handled through the REIT vehicle. Favorable
legislation in recent years has strengthened the REIT, and
new frontiers in exploiting the rules are still being
explored. Securitization, which has provided investors with
a comfortably more efficient real estate market, will
continue to play a major role in many real estate
transactions. Although it represents a very small facet of
the overall real estate industry, development through the
REIT vehicle seems to be a logical choice in the current
market. The use of REITs for development is likely to
continue through the 1990s and the evolution of new
techniques will surely improve the process over time.
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